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SUMMARY 
Throughout the world, corporate or good governance has become 
such a dominating terminology in the ever-increasing business 
vocabulary. Its fast rise and strategic relevance to the global 
business community is part ly due to the desire by the business 
leaders worldwide to be seen to be doing something about the 
scourge of corporate failures result ing from poor governance. 
 
The objective of the research was to establish to what extent Small 
and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) comply with good governance 
principles and practices. The SMEs in the Port Elizabeth CBD were 
chosen as the representative population of the SME sector 
throughout the country.  
 
The research methodology included: 
  A li terature study to determine, on the one hand the current 
good governance pract ices globally, and on the other the role, 
relevance and the challenges of the SMEs in the South African 
Economy. 
  An empirical study in order to obtain the empirical evidence 
concerning SME compliance to good governance principles 
and pract ice. This was done through a survey of SME sector in 
the Port Elizabeth CBD. 
  Lastly, the conclusion and recommendations.   
  
The conclusion was reached, inter alia , that the majority of SMEs do 
not comply with good governance principles and pract ices for 
various reasons. Therefore the following recommendations were 
made: 
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 Recommended that the organisational accountants appointed in terms of 
the law should not confine themselves to the financial aspects of the 
business only, but also look at governance of these small businesses. 
 Recommended that a sub-code for SMEs be developed. 
 Recommended that the existing code of governance be amended to 
include a clause that requires large and establish businesses to insist on 
good governance in the SMEs they deal with at any level.  
  Recommended that the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) 
should develop a qualification or unit standard on good governance to 
facilitate training on good governance.   
 Since good governance knowledge is a key competence for every 
manager, especially senior management. It is recommended that 
institutions of higher learning should have good governance in their 
curriculum.  
 
--------------- 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
The international and local community has been inundated with many corporate 
scandals and failures in the recent past. These scandals include amongst 
others many convoluted reporting structures, stealing technical or trade secrets 
from competitors, lack of transparency in executive pay and general corruption 
all of which erode shareholder value. These scandals together with the fast 
growing shareholder activism fuelled the pressure for the creation of the self 
regulatory framework or to some extent, legislation on governance. Many stock 
exchanges throughout the world have very stringent listing requirements to 
ensure sound governance on listed companies. On the other hand, listed 
companies who do not implement sound corporate governance practices, 
would forgo a share premium which they could have otherwise earned 
(McKinsey & Co, 2000). The consequence would be that larger entities in 
avoiding this backlash and possible bad publicity, would take good governance 
seriously.  
 
The SMEs on the other hand, do not have to comply with stock exchange listing 
requirements on corporate governance. More importantly, the SME’s share 
price or shareholder value is not determined by the investors in an open capital 
market as many SMEs are not listed. This creates a situation where SMEs are 
not inclined nor pressured to consider good governance as a business 
imperative or as being of any strategic relevance. This is further exacerbated by 
the fact that the King Report on corporate governance (2002) in South Africa 
otherwise referred to as the King II Report, excludes SMEs and only 
encourages stakeholders interacting with SMEs to monitor the application of the 
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governance code in so far as the principles are applicable to SMEs (King 
Report on corporate governance, 2002: 20).  
 
In a developing economy like South Africa, the role of SMEs both in creating 
employment, poverty alleviation and contributing to the total economic growth 
can never be underestimated. In South Africa with the advent of Black 
Economic Empowerment and preferential procurement policies, the SMEs are 
more often engaged in multi-million rand projects for and on behalf of 
government (Karunga, Nyadoro and Settle, 2000: 3). It is further estimated that 
eight out of ten new jobs created in South Africa are in SMEs (Karunga et al, 
2000: 7). SMEs also contribute an average of 30,2 per cent to the total GDP 
and 36,5 per cent of the employed people are work for the SMEs (Ntsika 
Annual Review, 2001: 41). The most crucial question then is whether these 
SMEs are managed in accordance to the acceptable governance principles and 
practices, given the role they play in the country’s economy.  
 
There is a feeling among the South African business community that they are 
trading under a highly over-legislated environment and thus compliance with 
good governance is a further burden which restrains their enterprising ability to 
build their companies (Andersen, 2003: 16). This view implies that many 
companies will not proactively embrace governance principles and practices, 
but will engage in them for as long as it does not affect the bottom line and is 
convenient to do so.  Good governance is therefore not seen as a business 
imperative, rather as a nice-to-have in order to impress stakeholders. 
 
The ownership structure of SMEs is different to that of public listed companies; 
they are owner-managed, family businesses or the result of two or three 
friends/colleagues forming a business. More often these entrepreneurs have 
limited or no capacity, resources and skills to develop and implement sound 
and good governance practices (Ezzamel and Watson, 1997). The SMEs are 
characterized by relatively weak stakeholders or interest groups like the unions, 
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institutional investors and most importantly, with no independent boards. The 
role of strong and vibrant SMEs in a developing economy is unquestionable 
(Malgas, 2003: 50 .  
 
The lack of poor governance has far-reaching negative consequences on well 
established large organisations, sometimes leading to total collapse of those 
organisations. This has been the case with companies such as  Leisurenet, 
WorldCom, Enron, Andersen Group, Parmalat and so on. The most pertinent 
question then would be to what extent the SMEs will be negatively affected by 
poor governance? (Scheepbouwer, 2003: 13).  
 
The key challenge is that there is a tendency to overemphasise corporate 
governance to the neglect of governance at SME level. Even the King II Report 
has not adequately addressed the SME compliance to good governance. SMEs 
play a pivotal role in the economic activity of the country and more importantly, 
SMEs today could be the big corporate institutions of tomorrow.  
 
The main problem of this research can therefore, be stated as follows: 
 
To ascertain to what extent SMEs in the Port Elizabeth CBD have implemented 
good governance principles and practices in the formulation of organisational 
structures, everyday decision making processes and more importantly, in the 
organisational operations. 
 
1.2  SUB-PROBLEMS 
 
The following sub-problems have been identified with a view to resolve the 
main problem as stated above: 
 
• What does the literature reveal about ethical and good governance 
principles and practices? 
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• What is the role and relevance of SMEs in the South African 
economy? 
• What is the situation with regard to good governance implementation 
by SMEs in the Port Elizabeth CBD? 
• What recommendations can be made to improve the ability of SMEs 
to overcome the barriers (if any) to the implementation of good 
governance? 
 
1.3  DEMARCATION OF THE RESEARCH 
 
The demarcation of the research serves to define precisely what would be 
done, the modus operandi and finally ensure that the research project is 
manageable. 
 
Below is how the research project is demarcated: 
• Interviewing the Senior Executives or owner-managers of various 
SMEs in different sectors and industries.   
• The size of the organisations is limited to those whose turnover is 
between R2,1 million and R40 million or alternatively employing 
between 6 and 200 employees with a with a maximum gross asset 
value of R15 million.  
• The research will be conducted amongst those organisations that are 
within the Port Elizabeth CBD. 
 
1.4  DEFINITION OF TERMS 
 
• SME – The National Small Business Act No. 102 of 1996 described 
the SMEs as a separate and distinct entity, which is not part of a 
group of companies. SME is an acronym for Small and Medium 
Enterprises. The total number of full time employees, total annual 
turnover and the gross asset value are used to distinguish between 
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small and medium sized enterprises. It is important to note that there 
is no common understanding of the use or definition of SMEs as it 
varies according to sector or industry. According to the National 
Small Business Act no. 102 of 1996, the agricultural sector, 
manufacturing sector and finance and business service sector are 
classified as follows: 
 
Table1.1: SME definition: Criteria per sector 
Sector Size No. of 
employees 
Annual 
turnover 
Gross 
asset 
value 
Agriculture Small  6 - 50 0,4-2m 2m 
 Medium 51-100  3-4m 4m 
 
Manufacturing Small  6 - 50 0,15-10m 3,7m 
 Medium 51-200 11-40m 15m 
 
Business service Small  6 - 50 2-10m 2m 
 Medium 51-100 11-20m 4m 
 
Retail Small 10-50 2,5 - 12,5m 1,5m 
 Medium 51-100 13 – 25m 3m 
Source: National Small Business Act no. 102 of 1996. 
 
It is always advisable to use the employee strength, gross asset 
value and the annual turnover to determine the category to which an 
entity belongs. For the purpose of this research, SMEs are those 
enterprises whose turnover is between two million and forty million 
rand and employing between six and two hundred employees and an 
asset value not exceeding R15 million. 
 
• Good governance – Financial scandals during the 1980s highlighted 
the apparent inadequacies of a framework of organisational 
accountability to meet the challenges in the business environment at 
the time, leading to a series of policy recommendations relating to 
corporate governance (Spira, 2001: 739-748). Since then there has 
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been a plethora of reports on corporate governance starting in the 
USA, spreading through to the UK and later South Africa and the rest 
of the world.  
 
In the USA it started in 1987 with the Treadway Commission Report, 
a National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting and was 
later followed by the COSO (Committee of Sponsoring Organizations) 
report in 1992 (Vinten, 2000: 173 -178).  In the UK it began with a 
Cadbury Committee Report in 1992, followed by a series of reports, 
namely the Rutteman, Hampel Report, Turnbull Report and the most 
recently in 2003, the Higgs Report and Smith Report (Vinten, 2000: 
173 -178).   
 
South Africa was not to be left behind. In 1994 a committee headed 
by Judge Mervyn E. King issued their first report called the King 
Report on corporate governance 1994. Later a more comprehensive 
report, namely the King II Report, was released in March 2002.  
 
Good governance is concerned with maintaining the balance 
between economic and social goals and between individual and 
communal goals. “The ultimate aim is to align as closely as possible 
the interest of individuals, corporations, and society” explained Sir 
Cadbury, the head of the Cadbury Committee according to the World 
Bank Report (1999, as quoted by Friends of the Earth International, 
2004). 
 
Clarke in 1998 argued that the spirit of enterprise must work within a 
sound framework of accountability, and the balance between them is 
critical. Charkham a member of the Cadbury Committee wrote in 
1998 that good governance means a proper balance between 
enterprise and accountability (Charkham, 1998(c): 179) 
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Solomon and Solomon (2004: 14) suggest that good governance is 
the system of checks and balances, both internal and external to the 
organisation, which ensures that these organisations discharge their 
responsibilities to all their stakeholders and act in a socially 
responsible way in all areas of their business activity. 
 
Good governance is about monitoring of management performance 
and ensuring accountability to all stakeholders by ensuring an ethical 
and transparent approach in everyday decision making without 
restraining the entrepreneurial activity. 
 
1.5  ASSUMPTIONS 
 
It is assumed that implementing and maintaining good governance practices do 
not only improve credibility of the organisations, but also improve the prospects 
of success. More importantly, good governance can prevent possible corporate 
backlash and unnecessary litigations and scandals that may result from poor 
governance.  At the same time it is assumed that good governance and 
accountability do not necessarily enhance entrepreneurial activity, but on the 
contrary, might stifle it. 
 
1.6   IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
There is a significant share premium earned by companies that practice good 
governance. This is as a result of the realization on the part of investors 
worldwide that good governance is a prerequisite for long-term growth.  
 
On the other hand, SMEs are not seen to be practising good governance and 
there are many closing closing down every year. It is estimated that five out of 
eight jobs created are again lost in the same year (Karunga et al, 2000: 7). 
Whether the inability to sustain SMEs over a long time and the SME’s inability 
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to create sustainable permanent employment are related to poor governance or 
is just a coincidence, is a topic for further research. However, it is an 
undisputable fact that organisations built on sound and ethical foundations can 
only breed success in the long-term. Most importantly SMEs are the future 
engine of economic growth in the country and every effort should be made to 
ensure that they are nurtured and built on sound governance principles. 
 
Globalisation has presented a lot of opportunities to many organisations and in 
particular to SMEs, to do business with other corresponding businesses all over 
the world.  The key element of international trade is credibility and a 
demonstration that a company practices good governance will always be an 
added advantage.  
 
One of the key challenges of SMEs is to access the much-needed finance for 
growth and expansion. Most financing institutions always analyse the past 
performance of the enterprise as one of the primary criteria for approving the 
financing proposal. SMEs with little or no track record are considered risky. The 
only consideration left will be the prospects of long-term success. 
Implementation of good governance principles and practices can be seen as 
the mitigating factor against this risk.  
 
The general public always expect large organisations and listed entities to 
practice good governance and do not expect the same from the SMEs. This is 
evident in a great deal of writing on good governance that concerns corporate 
governance only. The SMEs today are the future corporates, and the best time 
to instil a good governance culture is at this stage. An organisation that is built 
on poor governance from the very outset will not only have difficulties in 
changing its ways in future, but will struggle to survive. 
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1.7  REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE 
 
1.7.1 Introduction 
 
“Good governance will make a positive impact on the economic growth of our 
country, consolidating our credibility with foreign investors. It will also help us 
act as role models to the rest of Africa in our initiatives to support Nepad” said 
Tim Store, Chairman of Deloitte and Touche (Accountancy SA, 2003: 17). This 
conclusion of Tim Store is premised on the belief that a company with good 
governance will perform better over time or that good governance can 
significantly reduce risk and attract further investment. 
 
McKinsey and Company published an Investor Opinion Survey in June 2000. 
The survey found that: 
• More than 84 per cent of more than 200 global institutional investors 
together representing more than US$3 trillion in assets, indicated a 
willingness to pay a premium for the shares of a well governed 
company over one considered poorly governed but with a 
comparable financial record. 
• The actual premium these investors would be willing to pay varied 
from country to country. In emerging markets or markets perceived to 
have poor governance practices, this premium is about 22 per cent 
(King Report on corporate governance, 2002: 12).  
 
South Africa falls in the emerging market category and the implication 
of this finding is that not only would well-governed companies attract 
investment, but simple developing good governance practices can 
significantly increase shareholder value by 22 per cent.  
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1.7.2 Performance and conformance  
 
In an entrepreneurial organisation, power is usually centralized in the hands of 
a strong, frequently charismatic CEO. Such individuals usually dislike 
submitting to authority (Demb & Neubauer: 1992, 74). These people tend to be 
very forceful individuals who are prepared to take risks and challenge 
boundaries. The outcomes of their actions if successful tend to attract praise 
and if unsuccessful, will attract criticism.  More often than not the majority of 
stakeholders tend to lose because of these apparently unconstrained or 
unrestrained actions of this powerful leader (Spira, 2001: 739-748).   
 
The board, managing members (in case of close corporations) or executive 
management committee otherwise referred to as Exco, have a collective 
responsibility for the governance of the organisation. For the purpose of this 
research project this senior leadership structure will be referred to as the board. 
The board has to be completely independent if it is to be able to perform its 
most important governance role, namely to strike a balance between 
performance and conformance. However, the challenge is that many SMEs do 
not even have boards or any related structures. Instead power is centralised in 
the hands of a very powerful owner-manager or leader. If there are boards in 
place, they are often not strong and independent. 
 
There is a view that conforming to good governance practices can constrain the 
organisation’s ability to implement its strategies and take the necessary 
business risks and initiatives to develop and grow. The biggest challenge of the 
board is to enable the entrepreneurial activity to flourish within a framework of 
good governance and accountability.  
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1.7.3 Integrated Sustainability Reporting 
 
The King Report on corporate governance in 1994, unlike its counterparts in 
other countries in the world, went beyond the financial and regulatory aspect of 
corporate governance by advocating an integrated approach to good 
governance in the interest of a wide range of stakeholders (King Report on 
corporate governance, 2002: 5). The King Report 1994 introduced what it 
referred to as non-financial reporting and this was later changed in the King II 
Report. It is now referred to as Integrated Sustainability Reporting, capturing 
the fundamental principle of triple bottom line, which is integrated economic, 
social and environmental reporting (Khoza, 2002: 15). Integrated Sustainability 
Reporting is focused on the following headline issues: 
• Stakeholder relations 
This area does not only relates to the acceptance and adoption of a 
code of practice, but also the changes and benefits that have resulted 
from the adoption and implementation of the principles embodied in 
that code of practices. 
• Ethical practices and organisational integrity  
Once the company has determined its standards of ethical behaviour, 
it needs to disclose both the extent to which the directors believe the 
ethical standards are met and, if not, what plans are in place to 
achieve the desired level. 
• Safety, health and environment  
The companies need to go beyond requirements of the Occupational 
Health and Safety Act and environmental legislation. The companies 
must strive for safety and environmental practices that are motivated 
by a sense of responsibility, respect, humility and personal dignity.  
• Human capital  
This denotes the latent or potential value that employees represent 
for the company. This is the function of their knowledge, learning 
intuition, skill, expertise and experience. The company needs to 
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disclose the underlying principles, standards and goals adopted for 
the development of human capital. 
• Lastly, society and transformation, incorporating Black Economic 
Empowerment, gender and equity issues, HIV/AIDS as challenges 
that continue to be of strategic significance for South African 
companies (Khoza, 2002: 15). 
 
1.7.4 Ownership and control  
 
Directors/senior managers are the agents who manage the organisations on 
behalf of shareholders. Organisations that have a director with controlling 
shares are exempted from the agency cost associated with the appointment of 
management. This scenario is common among SMEs as most are owner-
managed. At the same time these organisations are exposed to the danger of 
management entrenchment. Management entrenchment occurs where the 
director is also a shareholder. What matters most in such an instance, is the 
creation of shareholder’s wealth even if that occurs at the expense of other 
stakeholders. The owner-managers are often lifetime directors and only 
accountable to themselves with no formal evaluation of their performance 
carried out by the board. 
 
This apparent lack of accountability can lead to a situation where other 
stakeholder interests are undermined in the pursuance of profit above all else. 
Achievements of broader stakeholder interest have a direct bearing on the 
ability of the organisation to achieve its own strategic objectives.  On the other 
hand, a selfish focus on one stakeholder interest, in this case the investor could 
antagonize other stakeholders and that can ultimately reduce the ability of the 
organisation to achieve its ultimate strategic objectives.  
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1.7.5 Boards and directors  
 
Good corporate governance is about good leadership. This assertion 
immediately raise the question about the composition of the board, styles of 
boards, the frequency and length of meetings, the formality of board 
proceedings, board culture and evaluation of directors (Korac-Kakabadse, 
Kakabadse and Kouzmin, 2001: 24-30). The board should ensure that the 
company complies with all relevant laws, regulations and codes of business 
practice and that it communicates with its shareholders and relevant 
stakeholders (internally and externally) openly and promptly and with substance 
prevailing over form (King Report on corporate governance, 2002: 21).  
 
The pertinent question is whether ineffectiveness or the non-existence of 
boards, which is common in SMEs, is synonymous with poor governance. The 
overriding goal of any enterprise is to consistently generate a competitive return 
on investment for its owners/ shareholders. The organisational leadership is 
accountable to shareholders for its stewardship of the company and the 
company assets and resources (Pricewaterhousecoopers, 2000: 6). The 
executives or owner managers often have a direct involvement in the day-to-
day activities of SMEs and naturally the company performance has a direct 
bearing on those individuals’ personal wealth.  
 
The WorldCom, Enron and the Health and Racket Club scandals were centred 
on the behaviour of executives who deliberately lied and created accounting 
practices to distort the trading reality of the respective business (Institute of 
Directors in Southern Africa, 2002: 19). In the organisations referred to above, 
the control structures, like independent boards, internal and external auditing 
systems were all considered to be effective.  This begs the question then is how 
great would be the temptation if there are no effective and independent boards, 
as is always the case with SMEs. 
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1.7.6 Accounting and auditing 
 
The reasons for the establishment of the Cadbury Committee, an equivalent of 
the King Committee on corporate governance in South Africa, which first 
reported in 1992, are explained from the perspective of its sponsors, the 
Financial Reporting Council and the Stock Exchange (Cadbury Committee 
Report, 1992: 14). Its sponsors were concerned at the perceived low level of 
confidence both in financial reporting and in the ability of auditors to provide the 
safeguards which users of company reports sought and expected. The 
underlying factors were seen as the looseness of accounting standards, the 
absence of a clear framework for ensuring that directors kept under review 
controls in the business, and competitive pressures both on companies and 
auditors which made it difficult for auditors to stand up to demanding boards 
(Cadbury Committee Report, 1992: 14).  
 
The implication here is that the deficiency of corporate governance lies in the 
failure to protect auditors from the pressure to sanction defective financial 
reports. This pressure is exerted by executive directors wishing to present an 
unduly optimistic picture about the corporate performance (Spira, 2001: 739-
748). Many commentators believe that the role of Anderson Consulting in the 
Enron saga was a fulfilment of this prophesy. Interestingly they were not seen 
as victims as the Cadbury Committee professed, but rather as active 
participants. 
 
The King Report on corporate governance (2002: 90) recommends that there 
should be an effective internal audit function that has the respect and co-
operation of both the board and management. The primary role of the internal 
audit function is to assist the board and management in the effective discharge 
of the board’s responsibilities by furnishing accurate analysis, appraisals, 
recommendation and information concerning the activities reviewed. The 
internal audit function should review the reliability and integrity of information, 
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compliance with policies and regulations, the safeguarding of assets, the 
economical and efficient use of resources and established operational goals 
and objectives. (Pricewaterhousecoopers, 2000: 9). The non-existence of an 
effective internal audit function can leave the organisation open to possible 
litigations due to non-compliance to legal and regulatory provisions. 
 
The audit committee is a committee of the board. There is no statutory 
requirement for the establishment of this committee. The King Report on 
corporate governance (2002: 141) recommends that the audit committee 
should comprise of mainly independent and non-executive directors that are 
financially literate. The audit committee of the board should approve the internal 
audit work plan. Another important function of the board’s audit committee is to 
keep under review all financial relationships between the company and its 
auditors to ensure the balance between the maintenance of objectivity and 
value for money (Vinten, 2000: 173 -178). The establishment of an audit 
committee may not always be possible in the SME sector. However, the 
concept of having a high level structure to co-ordinate the activities of the 
internal auditing function and also review the scope and results of the external 
audit, as well as its independency and objectivity is plausible.  
 
As mentioned earlier, all recommendations about corporate governance were 
precipitated by financial scandals of the late eighties up to the late nineties. This 
goes to show that accounting and auditing are an integral part of any 
governance model. 
  
1.7.7 Internal control and risk management 
 
Risk is an inherent and unavoidable element in the conduct of business. 
Maintaining the right balance between risk and return is the fundamental key to 
the maximization of shareholder wealth explain PricewaterhouseCoopers. The 
board failing to ensure that the company takes an appropriately measured 
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degree of risk in its activities is just as capable as the board failing to ensure 
that there are processes in place to minimize the negative impact of risk 
(Pricewaterhousecoopers, 2000: 23).  
 
The board should maintain a sound system of internal control to safeguard the 
shareholder’s investment and the company’s assets and the directors should at 
least annually conduct a review of the effectiveness of the company’s systems 
of internal controls and should report to shareholders that they have done so 
(Vinten, 2000: 173 -178). 
 
The board is responsible for the total process of risk management and in 
particular deciding the company’s appetite or tolerance for risk, which are those 
risks it will take or not take in pursuit of its goals and objectives. The board is 
further responsible for ensuring that a systematic, documented assessment of 
the processes and outcomes surrounding key risks is undertaken at least 
annually for the purpose of making its public statement on risk management. 
The public statement on risk should address the management strategy on 
mitigating any key risk identified during the risk assessment (King Report on 
corporate governance, 2002: 21). 
 
Risk management or internal control is a managerial function aimed at 
protecting the organisation, its people, assets and profits against the adverse 
consequences of risk more particularly aimed at reducing the severity or 
variability of losses (Valsamakis, Vivian and du Toit, 1992: 14).  
 
1.8  THE DATA AND THE TREATMENT OF THE DATA 
 
1.8.1 Literature survey 
The existing corporate governance standards and practices will be 
identified and analysed. The literature on the role and challenges of 
SME will be sought and evaluated.  
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1.8.2 Empirical study 
The empirical study will consist of the following: 
(i) Mail survey 
A mail survey will be conducted using a questionnaire 
constructed by the researcher. This questionnaire is intended to 
inquire whether SMEs are using or practising the existing good 
governance framework and standards. If not, why and if so, 
what have been the challenges and constraints? This 
questionnaire will be addressed to the owner-managers, Chief 
Executive Officers or the Managing Directors of the SMEs as 
defined. The reason for choosing top management is that good 
governance is driven from the top. 
 
(ii) Measuring instrument 
The researcher will develop a comprehensive questionnaire for 
this research project. The questionnaire may be followed up with 
selected interviews to the selected few. 
 
(iii) Sample  
The Port Elizabeth Regional Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (PERCCI), National Federated Chamber of Commerce 
(NAFCOC), Ntsika Development Agency and other business 
formations will be approached for the data base of their 
members. Only those organisations whose turnover is between 
R2-40 million  or whose employment is between 6 and 200 
employees within the Port Elizabeth CBD will be used for the 
survey. 
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(iv) Statistical analysis of data 
The statistical procedure to be used in interpreting and 
analysing data will be discussed in detail in chapter Four. 
A statistician will be consulted in the development of the 
research questionnaire and also in the consolidation and 
interpretation of the data. 
 
1.8.3 Development of recommendations 
The results of the literature survey and that of the empirical survey 
will be integrated and analysed with a view to developing 
recommendations to overcome barriers to the implementation of 
good governance principles and practices. 
 
1.9 DEPLOYMENT OF THE STUDY 
 
Chapter 1 
 
This chapter will present the main problem, sub-problems, definition of key 
concepts and more importantly explained the significance of the research.  
      
Chapter 2 
 
This chapter would look at the historical perspective of good governance 
and its fundamental drivers. The relevance of good governance in today's 
business will be discussed with particular emphasis on why good 
governance continues to occupy every business person’s mind. An overview 
of the element of good governance and good governance characteristics 
was discussed followed by good governance challenges.  
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Chapter 3  
 
The aim of this chapter would be to endeavour to explain the economic 
relevance of SMEs in the South African economy.  The South African 
economy with a particular focus on its macro-economic objectives will be 
briefly discussed.  
      
 Chapter 4 
 
This chapter will discuss the planning of the empirical research 
encompassing the planned pilot study, possible constraints, reliability and 
validity of methods used, designing and administering of the questionnaire, 
population and sampling. The statistical tools to be used in interpreting data 
would be identified and discussed.   
   
Chapter 5   
 
The aim of this chapter would be to present, analyse, interpret and integrate 
the results of the empirical research into the literature survey. The results of 
the empirical study would then be presented in the form of graphs, 
contingency tables with actual frequencies and percentages.  
 
Chapter 6  
 
This chapter will provide an overview of all research activities and present 
what has been achieved in each phase of the research activity. The possible 
practical importance of the results would be evaluated with a view to 
develop feasible recommendations. 
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1.10 SUMMARY 
 
This chapter presented the main problem, sub-problems, definition of key concepts 
and most importantly, explained the significance of the research. The following 
chapter will focus on the challenges and practices of corporate governance both 
locally and internationally. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
GOOD GOVERNANCE PRACTICES: THE CURRENT LOCAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGES 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate governance as a discipline is relatively new and has become one of the 
most commonly used phrases in the current global business vocabulary (Solomon 
& Solomon, 2004: 11). Good governance is seen as the primary remedy to 
restoring public confidence in business management after a number of corporate 
failures precipitated by fraud and negligence. As a result the growth of the interest 
in the corporate governance will be maintained for a very long time throughout the 
world (Solomon & Solomon, 2004: 11). 
 
Throughout this project ‘good governance’ is predominantly used as opposed to 
‘corporate governance’. The latter term tends to create an impression that it relates 
and applies to large and listed organisations only, to the exclusion of SMEs. This is 
so because most of the literature on governance such as the King Report on 
corporate governance (2002), Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003), 
the Higgs Report (2003), the Smith Report (2003), the Cadbury Report (1992), 
International Governance Newsletter and many more deals solely with listed 
companies. The preference for ‘good governance’ is inconsequential as the 
discourse is basically about company direction or management in the broad sense. 
 
In this chapter, the historical perspective of how good governance has evolved 
over the years will be discussed. This will be followed by an overview of the 
relevance of good governance and later the elements of good governance 
principles and practices and its characteristics. Lastly, this chapter will be 
concluded with the analysis of good governance challenges. The objective is to 
 22 
establish the critical elements of good governance principles as applicable to 
SMEs and possible challenges to effective implementation.  
 
2.2 THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE  
 
Business leaders just a few years ago were revered and highly respected and 
today are reviled. Businesses have become the most controversial institutions in 
society (Tapscott & Ticoll, 2003: XIII). This followed the highly publicised corporate 
failures and accounting scandals abroad as well as locally. Key in this debate is the 
role that good governance plays in the generation of economic returns to its 
owners and stakeholders. 
 
In an endeavour to give a short exposition of how corporate governance has 
evolved over the years, the following theoretical frameworks will be discussed: 
 
2.2.1 Agency theory 
 
Many companies, in particular SMEs, are financed by the individual owners. 
However, for these organisations to grow, more finance is required which 
may not necessarily be available from the owner, hence the development of 
stock markets to raise finance. Potential investors would buy shares of a 
particular company in a stock market and thus become shareholders of that 
company. This situation leads to the separation of ownership and 
management. This means the shareholder, referred to as the principal, 
would delegate the day-to-day decision making in the company to the 
directors who are the shareholder’s agents (Solomon & Solomon, 2004: 17).  
 
One of the principal assumptions of the agency theory is that the goals of 
the principal and the agent often conflict, as the agent does not necessarily 
make decisions in the interest of the principal (Solomon & Solomon, 2004: 
17). An example would be that the managers would be more inclined to 
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supplement their salaries with as many perquisites as possible and that can 
lead to a reduction in shareholder value. 
 
This on-going challenge of shareholders to control company management 
has precipitated the good governance movement. It must be said that most 
SMEs do not suffer from the agency problem as the majority of them are 
owner-managed. Payne (2003) argued that SMEs instead are exposed to 
the danger of what is referred to as management entrenchment by 
governance commentators. This is the opposite of the agency problem. 
Management entrenchment occurs when the director is also a shareholder 
of the same organisation. What matters most to this this director is the short-
term profit maximisation even if that may happen at the expense of other 
stakeholders and the well-being of the organisation. This could be classified 
as self-enrichment and is equally wrong. 
 
2.2.2 Transaction cost theory 
 
Transaction cost theory is based on the fact that companies have become 
so large such that the free market’s primary role of determining the 
allocation of resources and price determination is interfered with. 
Organisations attempt to have maximum control over all transactions 
because this removes the risk about future prices and production (Solomon 
& Solomon, 2004: 18). An example would be oil companies who are 
involved in oil exploration, to refining and eventually distribution (Solomon & 
Solomon, 2004: 18). 
 
One of the primary assumptions of the transaction cost theory is that 
generally people are opportunistic and will take advantage of any situation 
to further personal interests. Traditionally, profit maximization is the primary 
objective of the firm. The managers may pursue market dominance at the 
expense of profit maximization and thus can reduce shareholders’ wealth 
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(Solomon & Solomon, 2004: 17). The transaction cost theory also presents 
a strong argument for the control of management and that could be carried 
out through good governance. 
 
The transaction cost theory is not only relevant to large organisations but to 
SMEs as well since opportunism is not limited to directors of large 
organisations only. However, the extent to which an organisation can 
influence the market is determined by the size of that organisation. The key 
argument in this theory is that organisations comprise of people with 
divergent views and opinions who could arrange market transaction to their 
best interest. 
 
2.2.3 Stakeholder theory 
 
The basis for stakeholder theory is that the organisation’s impact on society 
is so pervasive that the need to discharge accountability is not limited to 
shareholders only but to a wide variety of stakeholders. Stakeholders 
include shareholders, customers, suppliers, employees, creditors, local 
community and the general public. 
 
Every attempt should be made to satisfy the minimum expectation of each 
stakeholder group if the organisation is to succeed in achieving its overall 
goals. A smart organisation creates a high level of employee satisfaction 
which leads to higher productivity, which in turn leads to higher quality 
products and services, ultimately leading to higher customer satisfaction. 
Repeat business could follow, which will lead to higher growth and profit and 
thus a higher shareholder satisfaction leading to more investment in the 
organisation (Kotler, 2000: 41). This assertion demonstrates that there is no 
contradiction between the shareholder wealth maximization and the 
stakeholder theory. 
 
 25 
2.3 THE RELEVANCE OF GOOD GOVERNANCE 
 
The previous discussion about the evolution of good governance emphasised the 
need to control directors so as to limit personal indulgence and ensure that the 
organisational focus is on long-term profit maximisation. However, the notorious 
collapse of Enron, one of America’s largest companies, fuelled the phenomenal 
growth of interest in good governance as a discipline larger than merely an effort to 
control directors. South Africa had its fair share of financial scandals ranging from 
Masterbond, Leisurenet and Regal Treasury to mention but a few. The challenge 
has always been to develop a governance model that will not only control the 
activities of directors but also help prevent the occurrence of such corporate 
financial scandals and corporate failures.  
 
A lot is written in the newspapers and business reports about the greed, 
negligence and corruption that often lead to the collapse of big organisations. On 
the other hand, the public never gets to hear about what is happening in the SME 
sector. The scope of influence and impact of an individual SME is limited according 
to the size of the SME concerned, hence it is possible that the scandals at that 
level do not make headline news.  
 
According to the Companies and Intellectual Property Registration Office, (CIPRO), 
there were about 12 500 close corporations that were either liquidated, dissolved 
or de-registered in 2003, a substantial increase from 11 900 in 2002 (Companies 
and Intellectual Property Registration Office, 2004). Considering that most SMEs 
are mostly incorporated as close corporation, (CC), it is fair to assume that this 
number of CCs collapsing every year adequately explains the situation with SMEs. 
It is highly probable that poor governance has contributed to some of these 
organisational failures. 
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2.3.1  Benefits of good governance 
 
a) Long-term sustainability 
Sustainability means conducting one’s activities in such a way that 
economic viability and profitability is maintained and enhanced for a very 
long time, while social and human capital is valued and developed, and that 
the resource base on which the organisations rely for its economic well-
being is protected and enhanced and not depleted (Chown, 2003: 34-37). 
Compliance with basic customer demand is a starting point for long-term 
sustainability. Embracing more far-sighted approaches like developing and 
implementing corporate social responsibility programmes, environmentally 
friendly strategies, audit supply chain, economic empowerment, and sound 
human resource practices and so on is the ideal situation.  
  
Karunga, Nyandoro and Settle (2000: 7) estimated that five out of eight jobs 
are created by SMEs and lost in the same year. The fact that during the 
period 2002 and 2003 about 25 000 SMEs collapsed also explains the 
challenge of sustaining SMEs once started (Companies and Intellectual 
Property Registration Office, 2004). Good governance requires that risk 
management and internal control should be embedded in the day-to-day 
activities of the business and should be practiced throughout the 
organisation by all employees (King Report on corporate governance, 2002: 
78). These internal control measures amongst others, should provide a 
reasonable assurance that the business sustainability is supported under 
normal, as well as adverse operating conditions (King Report on corporate 
governance, 2002: 78).  
  
b) Protection of creditors and financiers 
The cash flow requirements of SMEs vary according to the different stages 
of SME development. In the early stages of business development there is 
usually a negative cash flow, as more money is being disbursed in 
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developing the product, service and/or technology than money is coming in 
(if any) from operations (Karunga et al, 2000: 3).  These early stages of 
business development are clearly the most difficult and most risky both to 
the entrepreneur and the financing institution respectively. This period of 
negative cash flow is accordingly referred to as the valley of death, as 
illustrated in Figure 2.1 (Karunga et al, 2000: 7).  
 
If the enterprise is to succeed, the creditors and financing institutions are 
required to see the venture through this valley of negative cash flow. It is 
estimated that only about 25 per cent of business funding has gone into 
enterprises that are in the early stages of their development (Karunga et al, 
2000: 8). This is a very small percentage considering that there is a massive 
entry of SMEs in the economy.  
 
Good governance requires that organisations undertake proper risk 
management processes and implement internationally recognized internal 
control measures to mitigate and control risks (King Report on corporate 
governance, 2002: 78). This will help provide reasonable assurance that the 
enterprise will achieve the set goals and objectives (King Report on 
corporate governance, 2002: 78). If the enterprise achieves its goals and 
objectives, the risk of not recovering the finance invested is dramatically 
reduced.    
 
The important consideration in most financing transactions is always 
whether the loan granted will be used effectively and efficiently. If it has not 
been used both effectively and efficiently, the ability of the firm to repay may 
dramatically be reduced. Good governance requires organisations to 
develop and implement a code of ethics. Organisational ethics refer to the 
norms, principles and standards that guide the activities of the organisation 
in its internal relations and interactions with external stakeholders, in 
accordance with established values (King Report on corporate governance, 
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2002: 108). The King Report on corporate governance (2002: 108) 
recommends that all stakeholders be involved in the process of identifying 
the ethical principles and standards that will guide the organisation in its 
relationship. This creates an enormous opportunity for the financiers to 
participate in the creation and implementation of these organisational ethics 
and thus reduce the risk of non-payment.  
 
Figure 2.1: The valley of death compared to the distribution of venture   
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Source: Karunga, Nyandoro & Settle, 2000: 9 
 
c) Protection of investors 
The same argument presented for the protection of creditors holds in the 
case for investors. The interest of shareholders, in the case of listed entities, 
is in the share price driven by good financial results. Since the chief 
executive officers are given incentives to deliver these results, there is 
always a temptation to manipulate the figures in order to reflect what the 
market analyst and shareholders would like to see.  
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Good governance requires that shareholders, and particularly institutional 
investors, should increasingly become more involved and monitor 
management performance and thereby reduce the agency problem. This 
could be done through attending meetings, making serious interventions 
and voting on crucial policy issues like remuneration and through one-on-
one meetings with investing company management. The emphasis on the 
role to be played by institutional investors is as a result of the fact that there 
are the majority shareowners in South Africa (King Report on corporate 
governance, 2002: 163). Even at the level of SMEs through financing 
schemes like equity finance or venture capital, institutional investors play a 
major role.   
 
The National Association of Pension Funds and the Association of British 
Insurers in America and UK, respectively have published a report 
recommending to shareholders how to vote at annual general meetings 
(King Report on corporate governance, 2002: 163). This report done by 
these associations has had a positive impact on the governance.  The King 
Report on corporate governance (2002: 163) recommends that in South 
Africa these organisations need to be established and funded. The 
Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003: 20) encourages dialogue 
with institutional shareholders. It recommends that over and above the direct 
contact the shareholders have with the Chief Executive Officer and Financial 
Director, the Chairman and one senior independent director should maintain 
sufficient contact with major shareholders to understand their concerns 
(Combined Code on Corporate Governance, 2003: 20). 
 
SME shareholders are more often involved in the day-to-day decision 
making and activities of SMEs. Therefore the need to protect shareholders 
or investors in SMEs is less acute than in large organisations. However this 
is not always the case as many SMEs would have shareholders who are not 
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involved in the business. In that case the underlying principle of good 
governance would be just as acute as it would be in the large entities. The 
institutional investors who get involved in SMEs through equity finance and 
venture capital normally deploy a representative to the management team of 
that organisation. 
   
d) Stakeholder confidence 
The proponents of good governance as premised on the stakeholder theory 
often insist that the success of any organisation is dependant on the 
achievement of all stakeholder interest. One of the key principles of good 
governance is disclosure of governance arrangements. The organisations 
are required to state the extent of compliance with good governance over 
and above the dissemination of reliable information. If there is any departure 
or non-compliance there should be an appropriate explanation. The King 
Report on corporate governance (2002: 160) argues that if a certain conduct 
or behaviour is required to be disclosed the chances of that behaviour 
occurring are less. Disclosures and transparency deter the incidence of 
malpractice and excessive executive rewards. 
 
Disclosures not only reduce the chances of malpractice, but also improve 
the stakeholder confidence since all stakeholders know exactly what is 
happening in the business and the extent to which their interests are being 
taken care of. Stakeholder confidence will not only be improved by 
disclosures but also by a combination of other good governance practices 
like robust risk management process, ethical practices and coherent 
leadership.  
 
An example of the kind of confidence required by stakeholders is that of 
customers. Some SMEs provide a critical service or product to large 
corporations (SME’s customer) and these corporations have delivery 
obligations towards their clients. These corporations need to be confident 
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and be assured that the SME will deliver not only on time but also to 
acceptable quality standards. Good governance plays a major role in 
allaying any fears the large organisations may have on the capability of the 
SME.  
  
e) Leadership development 
This could have been an unintended consequence of good governance that 
at the end of the day creates leaders of good quality. Good governance 
requires probity, efficiency, transparency and duty of care. The latter, means 
a requirement to exhibit the degree of care, diligence and skill that may 
reasonably be expected of individuals with their knowledge and skill 
(Pricewaterhousecoopers, 2000: 30). This immediately discourages any 
form of negligence and requires directors to act and conduct the business 
activity responsibly 
 
Solomon and Solomon (2004: 30) in their research found that one reason 
why good governance and corporate social responsibility can be linked to 
good financial performance is their link with management quality. Ineptitude, 
corruption and inefficiency have been the words used to describe the 
leadership of both the public and private institutions in South Africa. Good 
governance militates against that type of behaviour and requires 
management to act in socially responsible way and be accountable.  
 
2.4 ELEMENTS OF GOOD GOVERNANCE 
  
Good governance is generally understood to mean the way or systems by which 
companies are directed and controlled (Mongalo, 2003: 151). Good governance 
exists primarily for the purpose of monitoring and controlling the powers of the 
decision makers. Good governance is an organisation-wide intervention 
encompassing all aspects of business activity from top to bottom and all decision 
making processes should be guided by the governance principles (Solomon & 
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Solomon, 2004: 30). The following areas are the critical elements of good 
governance practices: 
 
2.4.1 Board and directors 
The board’s main task is to ensure full and effective control over the 
organisation. This task can be achieved by monitoring and evaluating the 
executive management, ensuring compliance with relevant laws and 
regulations, complying with codes of business best practices and facilitating 
prompt and efficient communication with all relevant stakeholders (King 
Report on corporate governance, 2002: 50). The King Report on corporate 
governance (2002: 46) continues to argue that all companies must be 
headed by an effective board that can both lead and control the company.  
Solomon and Solomon (2004: 45) argue that the board is the heart of the 
organisation and, therefore needs to be fit, healthy and carefully nurtured for 
the organisation to run effectively.  
Solomon and Solomon (2004: 66) distilled  a list of what they referred to as 
the recipe for a good board from academic literature on boards and as well 
as from the various good governance codes: 
 The board should meet frequently. 
 The board should maintain a good balance of power. 
 An individual should not be allowed to dominate board meetings and 
decision making. 
 Members of the board should be open to another member’s 
suggestion. 
 There should be high level of trust between members of the board. 
 Board members should be ethical and have a high level of integrity. 
 There must be a high level of effective communication between 
members of the board. 
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 The board should be responsible for the financial statements of the 
company. 
 Non-executive directors should provide an independent point of view. 
 The board should be open to new ideas and strategies and must be a 
learning board. 
 Board members must embrace change. 
 The board must posses an in-depth understanding of the company 
business. 
 The board must be dynamic in nature. 
 The board must understand the inherent risk of the business. 
 The board must be prepared to take calculated risks. No risk no 
return. 
 The board must be aware of stakeholder issues and be prepared to 
engage actively with the stakeholders. 
 The board members should not be averse to attending training 
courses. 
All academic literature on good governance and various codes on good 
governance place a lot of emphasis on boards and directors as the 
custodians and drivers of good governance in their companies. The premise 
of good governance on this issue is that a properly constituted board would 
be able to provide an independent judgement and thus independent 
decision making (Solomon & Solomon, 2004: 67).  
There is often a tendency from the business leaders to manipulate the 
system with a view to enriching themselves as evident from the previous 
corporate scandals discussed in Paragraph 1.7.5. There is therefore such 
an overwhelming emphasis on board effectiveness and board 
independence. As discussed earlier in Paragraph 1.7.4, most SMEs are 
owner-managed with no boards or independent directors in place. Since 
there are no boards in place to provide for the checks and balances 
necessary to ensure that the organisation acts in a socially responsible 
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manner in all its activities, the temptation to manipulate the system could be 
great.  
The King Report on corporate governance (2002) and the Hampel 
Committee Report (1998), its equivalent in the United Kingdom, seems to 
have similar recommendations in relation to the composition of the boards. 
There should be a delicate balance between the non-executive and non-
executive directors. The majority of non-executive should be independent, 
and boards should disclose in the annual report which of the non-executive 
directors are considered to be independent. Although the description of the 
independence of independent directors seems inadequate, in the South 
African context the boards should be representative in terms of 
demographics. 
It is a normal practice that directors are appointed by shareholders at the 
annual general meetings. SMEs that are often owner-managed and 
sometimes referred to as entrepreneurial organisations do not necessarily 
hold annual general meetings. The owner-manager would decide at will to 
appoint directors to work in his/her businesses as he/she chooses. It follows 
therefore that these directors would be relatives, friends and/or associates 
of the owner. These directors appointed by the owner would have serious 
difficulties in maintaining the balance when the challenge of management 
entrenchment creeps in. This may invariably be detrimental to the long-term 
maximisation of shareholder value and well-being of the organisation.  It is 
probably not possible, without pre-empting the research, to expect these 
directors appointed by the owner-manager to be effective in discharging 
their duties with the expected levels of independency and scrutiny.  
The appointment of directors by the entrepreneurial organisation should be 
applauded as a positive step towards the right direction as many SMEs do 
not even have boards. 
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2.4.2 Governance structures 
 
The following discussions on governance structures are based on the 
recommendations of both the Combined Code on Corporate Governance 
(2003), the UK equivalent of the King Report and the King Report on 
corporate governance (2002): 
 
a) Board committees 
Board committees are an aid to the board and directors in discharging 
their good governance duties and responsibilities particularly in specific 
areas such as risk management, internal and external audit, 
remuneration and internal control (King Report on corporate governance, 
2002: 70). It is the responsibility of the board to determine the relevance, 
appropriateness and number of committees it wishes to have, but the 
King Report on corporate governance (2002: 72) recommends that, at 
minimum, there should be two committees, namely, the remuneration 
and audit committees. Other possible committees are Risk, 
Environmental, Safety and Health, Governance, Nomination, Executive 
or Management, Ethics and so on. The nature and industry specific 
issues will dictate what committees the board needs to have (King 
Report on corporate governance, 2002: 70). 
 
b) Internal audit 
The King Report on corporate governance (2002: 90) recommends that 
there should be an effective internal audit function that has the respect 
and co-operation of both the board and management. The primary role 
of internal audit function is to provide reasonable assurance to the board 
and management regarding the effectiveness of the company’s good 
governance, risk management and the systems of internal controls (King 
Report on corporate governance, 2002: 90). The internal audit function 
should review the integrity and reliability of information, compliance with 
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policies and regulation, the safeguarding of assets and efficient use of 
resources (Pricewaterhousecoopers, 2000: 9). This is an important 
governance structure that provides the necessary checks and balances 
in an organisation (King Report on corporate governance, 1994: 20). 
 
c) External audit 
It is a legal requirement for every company to appoint an auditor or firm 
of auditors (Companies Act No 61 of 1973). The external audit provides 
an independent and objective check on the way in which the financial 
statements have been prepared and presented by the directors (King 
Report on corporate governance, 2002: 133). External auditors have a 
statutory duty to report their independent opinion to the shareowners 
(King Report on corporate governance, 2002: 90). 
 
d) Financiers/bondholders 
One of the important sources of financing an organisation other than 
equity finance, in particular SMEs, is loans. An organisation may raise 
finance by issuing debentures or a simple loan from the bank or any 
other financing institution. These creditors immediately become not only 
a stakeholder, but an important structure that has a direct interest in how 
the company is run. Through their participation on various capacities in 
the company and finance conditions, good governance will be improved. 
 
e) Shareholder/institutional investors 
The inertia of shareholders and in particular institutional investors is 
largely responsible for the non-enforcement of the breach of duties by 
directors and management (King Report on corporate governance, 2002: 
163). Although individual shareholders can vote at the Annual General 
Meetings, their influence in terms of policy direction is minimal. The 
option left for these disgruntled shareholders is either to keep quiet and 
hope things will change later or sell the shares. On the other hand, 
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institutional investors have an opportunity to engage in one-on-one 
meetings in an effort to ensure maximum returns for its clients.  
 
Karunga et al (2000: 10) maintain that the equity and venture capital 
funds are slowly getting into the SME sector to take advantage of the 
government procurement policies which are supportive of SMEs. Once 
the equity and venture capitalist take a stake in a business, they deploy 
a competent individual to ensure a good return on investment. This will 
not only ensure good returns on investment but also contribute towards 
the much needed capacity building in the SMEs and more importantly, 
good governance would be improved. 
 
f) Employees 
In many instances management are compelled to consult with the 
workers on matters that affect the employees. Employees can, through 
workplace forums or unions, raise their concerns about governance with 
a view to ensuring long-term employment and employee growth.   
 
2.4.3 Risk management and internal control  
 
Risks are uncertain future events that could negatively influence the 
company objectives but that need to be undertaken if the company is to 
stand a chance of achieving any return (King Report on corporate 
governance, 2002: 76). Maintaining the right balance between risk and 
return is the fundamental key to maximisation of shareholder wealth 
(Pricewaterhousecoopers, 2000: 23).  
 
Risk management is the process that utilises internal controls as a measure 
to mitigate and control risks (King Report on corporate governance, 2002: 
76). The directors are not expected to understand the nuances of every line 
of business nor to oversee every transaction. Instead they are responsible 
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for setting the tone regarding the organisation’s risk-appetite and for 
establishing effective monitoring programmes. The enterprise-wide risk 
management is a discipline that an organisation can use to identify possible 
occurrences that may affect its ability to achieve strategic goals and to 
manage its activities consistent with its risk appetite (Bies, 2004: 3). 
 
These occurrences may result in adverse outcomes but could also bring 
opportunities. The King Report on corporate governance (2002: 78) 
recommends that risk should not be viewed from the negative perspective 
since the review process may identify areas of opportunities that can be 
turned into competitive advantage. When embraced, an enterprise-wide risk 
management framework improves the quality and flow of information for 
decision makers and stakeholders, focuses attention on the achievement of 
organisational goals, and improves the overall governance of an 
organisation. 
 Hollman and Forrest (1991: 20) suggested five steps in the risk 
management process that each organisation needs to implement to ensure 
that the firm’s assets and profits are protected. 
 
 The following are the five steps: 
a) The identification of risk 
 This is the very first and most important step in the risk management 
process because risk can never be evaluated, treated or mitigated 
unless it is known. This stage includes developing a checklist of all 
possible risks, flow-charting the operations, formal surveys, personal 
inspections and so on. This can be a very difficult and tedious process 
because risks in any business are numerous and may sometimes be 
abstract.  
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b) Evaluation of loss exposure/risk 
 The second step in the risk management process is the evaluation of the 
risks that have been identified.  This step is concerned with measuring 
and estimating three dimensions of each risk exposure. The first 
dimension relates to the potential frequency of occurrence of each 
identified risk. The second dimension would be the potential impact 
should the risk occur (the severity) and lastly, the potential variation in 
losses that will actually occur during the exposure period.  
 The relevance of this step is to determine which risks are most serious 
and which deserve the most immediate attention. This leads to the 
establishment of risk management priorities and provides a starting point 
for the selection of the appropriate risk management technique. 
 
c) Selection of techniques  
 The third step is to select the relevant technique/s that can be used to 
mitigate the risk exposures. These techniques can be divided into two 
broad categories: operational techniques and financing techniques.  
 Operational techniques are designed to alter the risk exposure and that 
is to either reduce the possibility of a loss or its severity (Hollman et al, 
1991: 21). By contrast, financing techniques are designed to minimize 
the adverse effects of accidental losses by providing funds for losses 
that occur (Hollman and Forrest, 1991: 21). 
(i) Operational techniques  
 Operational techniques can be divided into four categories. These are 
avoidance/termination of risk, loss control/treatment of risk, combination 
and lastly transfer of risk to the third person. Avoidance or termination of 
risk is designed to eliminate the possibility of loss from an asset or 
activity by not owning the asset or choosing not to engage in the activity, 
process or operation (Hollman and Forrest, 1991: 21). 
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 Loss control/treatment of risk are concerned with the reduction but not 
the entire elimination of the possible risk. This process may take one of 
the three forms: loss prevention, loss reduction and separation. Loss 
prevention is focused on reducing the frequency of adverse occurrences 
by reducing or eliminating the factors that may cause losses (Hollman 
and Forrest, 1991: 22). 
 
 It is argued that even when the most stringent loss prevention strategies 
are in place losses may still occur. This possibility warrants the 
implementation of the loss reduction strategy, which is concerned with 
lessening the severity of losses that occur when prevention strategies 
are not fully effective.  The last form of loss control is separation and is 
concerned with minimizing the loss by physical dimensions for an 
example location (Hollman and Forrest, 1991: 22). 
  
 The third major operational technique is combination which involves the 
accumulation of services units to reduce the possibility or severity of 
losses through grouping (Hollman and Forrest, 1991: 21). 
 
 The fourth and the last operational technique is the transfer of risk. It is 
often feasible and economical to transfer to persons or entities other 
than commercial insurers. This could be a transfer of ownership all parts 
or processes of a specific loss exposure to another person or entity 
(Hollman and Forrest, 1991: 22). 
(ii) Financing techniques  
 Financing techniques do not alter the risk itself but make provision for 
funds should losses occur despite the control efforts.  The most 
commonly used financing technique is insurance. Insurance allows the 
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insured to transfer the potential financial consequences of a loss 
exposure to the insurer (Hollman and Forrest, 1991: 22).  
 
d) Implementation of techniques 
The implementation stage is an action stage, but it must be preceded 
firstly by determining the risk appetite of the firm and setting out clear 
risk and return objectives. Thereafter all employees and stakeholders 
such as suppliers, clients, lawyers, accountants must be engaged and 
informed of the risk management objectives and the roles they need to 
play in helping the company achieve those objectives (Hollman and 
Forrest, 1991: 23). The communication of the roles must be followed by 
revised contractual working arrangements, developing safety 
programmes, negotiating insurance and investigating losses is part of 
the implementation stage. 
 
e) Monitoring 
The risk management function is a continuous process. The final step in 
the risk management process involves appraising the operation of the 
programme regularly to ensure it achieves the desired results. To 
monitor the risk management process effectively, the risk manager must 
set the performance objectives, determine risk tolerance limits, do 
random and periodic audits, determine deviations and undertake 
remedial action.  
 
Several elements are essential to the successful implementation of 
enterprise wide risk management processes (Bies, 2004: 3). One of 
these is a clearly articulated risk-management goal which provides a 
foundation for the enterprise-wide risk management programmes and for 
related training and communication. The second element is a common 
risk language which is critical because it enables individuals throughout 
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the organisation to conduct meaningful cross-functional discussions 
about risk. A third element essential to the implementation of successful 
enterprise-wide risk management is that individuals clearly understand 
their roles in the risk assessment and risk management framework. In 
today's environment, all organisations should consider embracing this 
discipline.  
   
2.4.4 Reporting 
 
The issue of reporting is about the flow of communication to various 
stakeholders, including the shareholders of the business. Reporting, either 
to the shareholder or the public and the interested parties at large, is a 
critical element of governance in that it advances the principle of 
transparency and openness. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in the US (as 
quoted by Tapscott & Ticoll, 2003: 248) requires companies to disclose to 
the public on a rapid and current basis such additional information 
concerning material changes in the financial condition or operation of the 
company in simple language. This emphasises the importance and 
relevance of reporting to all stakeholders as a critical governance element 
utilised throughout the world. 
 
The prerequisite for reporting to be effective is that it must be real-time 
reporting with all relevant stakeholders and the investment community. This 
is possible given the Internet revolution. However, the organisations issuing 
the information need to pay particular attention to the security of data 
communicated electronically. 
 
Reporting can be categorized into statutory reporting and non-statutory 
reporting (Pricewaterhousecoopers, 2000: 25). The former refers to all 
reports as required by the government regulation and legislation and while 
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the latter refers to the governance recommendation or any information the 
enterprise deems as relevant to its stakeholders. 
 
a) Statutory reporting 
Companies Act of 1973 (Schedule 4) lays out the detailed requirement 
for financial reporting. The board must discharge this responsibility in 
conformity with the South African Statements of General Accepted 
Accounting Practice and in a manner required by the Companies act? 
(Pricewaterhousecoopers, 2000: 26). The annual financial statements 
should inter alia include the income statement, balance sheet, 
statements of changes in equity, cash flow statement, director’s report 
and an auditor’s report.  These reports should be presented to the 
annual general meeting of the shareholders within the required time after 
the end of the financial year. 
 
Pricewaterhousecoopers (2000: 26) insist that it is the board’s 
responsibility and not the external auditors to ensure that the financial 
statements give a fair presentation of the company’s financial position, 
results of its operations and cash flows for each financial year. This 
means that the directors need to take the necessary precaution to 
ensure that there is no overstatement or understatement.  
 
Pricewaterhousecoopers (2000: 26) recommend that the directors 
should: 
 Ensure that adequate accounting records that present the 
company's state of affairs and explain the company’s transactions 
are kept. 
 Approve the annual financial statements. 
 Ensure that companies send out the copies of the annual financial 
statements to all shareholders and relevant stakeholders. 
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b) Non-statutory reporting 
The King Report on corporate governance (2002: 35) advocates the 
need for every company to report at least annually on the nature and 
extent of its social, transformation, ethical, safety, health and 
environmental management policies and practices. This is referred to as 
integrated sustainable reporting. The King Report on corporate 
governance (2002: 35) recommends that organisations should 
categorise the levels of reporting into the following three areas: 
 Disclosures relating to acceptance and adoption of business 
principles and/or codes of good practice that can be verified by 
reference to documents, board minutes or established policies 
and standards. 
 Addressing the implementation of the set practices and principles 
involving a review of steps taken to encourage adherence to 
these principles. 
 Investigating and demonstrating changes and benefits that have 
resulted from the adoption and implementation of the stated 
principles and/or codes of good practice. 
 
Although the reporting referred to above is not a legal requirement, all 
organisations including SMEs are well advised to report on these issues as 
indicated, since non-reporting can easily be construed as non-conformance. 
 
2.4.5 Organisational accountability  
 
The King Report on corporate governance (2002: 5) disputes vigorously the 
notion that directors are accountable to all stakeholders in that this view is 
self defeating since directors would end up not being accountable to 
anyone. The report goes further to indicate that the directors are 
accountable first and foremost to the company and only responsible to the 
relevant stakeholders. This argument presupposes that all organisations 
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would voluntary comply with the voluntary codes of good practice. The 
inherent limitation of voluntary codes of good practice is that they can never 
be enforceable. Therefore even if any one of the stakeholders feels 
aggrieved, there is no recourse. The UNDP Human Development Report 
(1999, as quoted by Friends of the Earth International, 2004) concluded that 
there is a need to develop rules and regulations to protect other 
stakeholders or affected parties. There are three areas that that the report 
emphasises; firstly the human concerns relating to adherence to labour 
standards and human rights. The second area is the economic efficiency 
referring to promotion of fair trade and competitive markets and lastly 
ensuring environmental sustainability by preventing environmental 
destruction, degradation and pollution. 
One can deduce from these UNDP recommendations that the primary 
objective of organisational accountability is to ensure that whatever the 
organisations are doing can withstand public scrutiny and is above 
reproach. This can be achieved if only the stakeholders or any other 
institutions dealing with the organisation at whatever level are able and 
empowered to hold these organisations accountable. The unions, through 
various labour legislations are able to ensure that the organisations comply 
with the labour standards. This should apply to other stakeholders as well. 
2.4.6 Business ethics 
 
Business ethics refer to the principles and standards that the organisation 
promotes for the guidance and conduct of its activities, internal relations and 
interactions with external stakeholders (Pricewaterhousecoopers, 2002: 22). 
The King Report on corporate governance (2002: 108) explains that ethical 
business conduct is about ensuring that the organisation’s employees 
adhere to the defined standards of behaviour in all their business decisions 
and activities.  
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It is extremely important that a strong culture of ethical behaviour be 
established at the top of the organisation and that a proper ethical tone is 
set for governing the conduct of business. More often business executives 
are compelled to consciously conceal or exaggerate with a view to 
persuading others to agree or support their intentions.  The WorldCom, 
Enron and the Health and Racket Club scandals were centred on the 
behaviour of executives who deliberately lied and created accounting 
practices to distort the trading reality of the respective business (Institute of 
Directors in Southern Africa, 2002: 19).  
 
There is a myth that the organisation should not be held responsible for the 
misdeeds of rogue employees. Paine (2003: 86) argues that an unethical 
business practice involves the tacit, if not the explicit cooperation of others 
and reflects the values, attitudes, beliefs and behavioural patterns that 
define an organisation’s culture.  Organisations need to develop and 
implement systems and structures that facilitate ethical conduct. Botha 
(1999: 33) presents twelve components (adapted from the Ethics Resource 
Centre, USA) required for developing, implementing and managing a 
comprehensive ethics programme: 
 Focus on ethical leadership. 
 Vision statement. 
 Value statement. 
 Code of ethics. 
 Designated ethics official. 
 Ethics task force or ethics committee. 
 Ethics communication strategy. 
 Ethics training. 
 Ethics helpline. 
 Ethical behaviour - rewards and sanction. 
 System to monitor and trace ethical data. 
 Periodic evaluation of efforts and data. 
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The King Report on corporate governance (2002: 108) states that the ethical 
principles and standards that will guide the organisational practice have to 
be established with the full participation of relevant stakeholders. The King 
Report on corporate governance (2002: 109) recommends that the ethical 
principles that will demonstrate a commitment to organisational integrity are: 
 Fairness 
 Transparency 
 Honesty 
 Non-discrimination 
 Accountability and responsibility 
 Respect for human dignity, human rights and social justice 
 
There is an argument that government regulates various industries as it 
sees fit, perhaps as a result of pressure by the structures of civil society. 
Therefore, there is no obligation on the business to stop and consider who 
will get hurt in its pursuance for profit as long as it remains within the legal 
framework. Good governance requires that organisations in their 
endeavours to maximise shareholder wealth should do so in such a way that 
it respects the interests of society. When the business violates the interest 
of society its legitimacy is eroded (Rossouw, 2002: 25). Ethical behaviour 
considers not only what is good for oneself but that also considers what is 
good for the society at large. Ethics encourage taking interest in oneself first 
because the well-being of yourself is a prerequisite for a balanced and long-
term interaction with other people (Rossouw, 2002: 4). Therefore, there is 
absolutely nothing wrong in organisations vigorously pursuing profits 
because in so doing, investors would be more inclined to invest more and 
that will have positive spin offs for the society at large. 
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2.4.7 Compliance and conformance 
Governance (2000: 2) argues that no governance system or code can ever 
hope to prevent those who are determined to abuse and breach the 
acceptable standards of good behaviour nor should that be its main aim. A 
system that emphasises policing and the prevention of abuse above risk 
taking would be destructive to economic progress (Governance, 2000: 2). 
The King Report on corporate governance (2002: 154) concurs and further 
argues that the imposition of responsibilities that are too burdensome on 
directors or managers of companies will deter capable and honest people 
from accepting appointments to the boards of companies. However, the 
principles embodied in the governance code are effective only if adequate 
remedies and sanctions exist to enforce compliance.  
The board and senior management are obligated to deliver a strong 
message to others in the firm about the importance of integrity, compliance 
with the law, fair treatment of customers, and overall good business ethics. 
In many instances, senior management regards compliance mainly as a 
cost center instead of considering the benefits of compliance in protecting 
the business against legal and reputational risks that can have an impact on 
the bottom line (Bies, 2004: 4). These principles and values are just as 
relevant to SMEs as there are to the big business. 
2.4.8 Remuneration  
Jackson (1997: 17) reports that a research published by the Wharton 
Business School in the USA suggested that companies with chief 
executives who overpay themselves perform badly in terms of profits and 
share price. This report attributes the blame to weak governance and to a 
lack of alignment between individual’s and shareholder’s interests.  
The board should appraise the performance of the chairman and directors 
on an annual or any other basis as the board may determine. The board 
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should establish a remuneration committee made up of independent non-
executive directors. Decisions on the remuneration packages of executive 
directors should be delegated to the remuneration committee. The broad 
framework and cost of executive remuneration should be a matter for the 
board, acting on the advice of the remuneration committee. The focus 
should be more on linking corporate performance to the incentives and 
bonuses paid out. 
 
It may not be possible at an SME level to have a remuneration committee 
constituted in terms of the acceptable governance principles and practices. 
The most important thing is that the remuneration needs to be established in 
an open and transparent way so as to avoid any unjustified compensation. 
 
2.5 THE CHARACTERISTICS OF GOOD GOVERNANCE  
 
The King Report on corporate governance (2002: 10) illustrates what can be 
regarded as constituting the seven characteristics of good governance.  
 
2.5.1 Discipline 
Organisational discipline is a commitment by a company’s management to 
adhere to behaviour that is universally recognised and accepted to be 
correct and proper (King Report on corporate governance, 2002: 10). This 
encompasses a commitment to the underlying principles of good 
governance and indicates the extent of conformance in the annual reports.  
 
2.5.2 Transparency 
 
Executive remuneration was considered proprietary information and today is 
a matter of public knowledge. The King Report on corporate governance 
(2002: 10) defines transparency as the ease with which an outsider is able 
to make a meaningful analysis of the company’s actions, its economic 
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fundamentals and non-financial aspects pertinent to that business. Much of 
the information is rightfully confidential, it could be competitive or for privacy 
reasons and firms have ethical obligations to protect certain information 
(Tapscott & Ticoll, 2003: 38). What good governance requires of these 
organisations is for management to avail the necessary information in a 
candid, accurate and timely manner to enable all stakeholders to have a 
correct picture of what is happening in the business (King Report on 
corporate governance, 2002: 10). SMEs need not go to the extent of making 
senior management remuneration public, but the stakeholders like unions, 
employees, creditors, suppliers and so on should not struggle to find 
information relevant to their interest in the business.  
 
2.5.3 Independence 
 
The King Report on corporate governance (2002: 10) explains that 
independency is the extent to which mechanisms have been put in place in 
order to avoid potential conflicts of interest that may exist. These conflicts of 
interest could be the dominance by a strong chief executive officer or a 
majority shareholder. In Paragraph 2.4.1 the dominance of owner-managers 
in SMEs and its dangers were discussed. If SMEs are to achieve a 
sustainable growth, there should be systems and mechanisms in place to 
prevent the owner-managers indulging in unethical conduct. The 
mechanisms that can be put in place are inter alia  the composition of the 
board, independent auditors or any other governance structures that may 
help reduce undue influences.  
 
2.5.4 Accountability 
 
Organisational accountability is about being accountable to a huge array of 
people being affected by the entity’s activities (Rossouw, 2002: 139). The  
King Report on corporate governance (2002: 10) recommends that 
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mechanisms and systems that allow for effective accountability by decision 
makers in the organisation must be established. These systems should not 
only be on paper, but should help all relevant stakeholders to have recourse 
when aggrieved. 
 
2.5.5 Responsibility 
 
Organisational responsibility is about being a good corporate citizen. In 
explaining organisational responsibility Donaldson (2003: 133) used an 
example of Motorola who turned away from a government deal which could 
have increase its annual net profit by 25 per cent because the officials 
demanded a $1 million as a kickback. Organisational responsibility is about 
creating a culture that treats organisation values and standards as 
absolutes, that can never be waived under any circumstances. 
 
2.5.6 Fairness 
 
The King Report on corporate governance (2002: 11) recommends that the 
rights of various groups and stakeholders have to be acknowledged and 
respected. There need to be systems and structures to ensure that 
particular stakeholder receives preferential treatment over the other.  The 
King Report on corporate governance (2002: 10) gives an example of a 
minority shareholder as opposed to the dominant majority shareholder. 
 
2.5.7 Social responsibility 
 
Solomon and Solomon (2004: 191) claim that Milton Friedman a free market 
economist, was ostracised for stating that the only responsibility an 
organisation had towards the society was to maximise shareholders wealth. 
This economist argued that any attempts by companies to spend money on 
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charitable donations or attempts to satisfy other stakeholders other than the 
shareholders were at best misguided.  
 
There is another argument that the cost of social responsibility reduces the 
returns that would naturally be due to the shareholders. Solomon and 
Solomon (2004: 191) argue that social irresponsibility would negatively 
affect financial performance. A good corporate citizen could be regarded by 
the organisation as non-discriminatory, non-exploitive, and responsible with 
regard to environment and human rights issues (King Report on corporate 
governance, 2002: 11). 
 
2.6 THE CHALLENGES OF GOOD GOVERNANCE 
 
2.6.1 Pay systems/remuneration 
 
The process of determining and setting an executive pay at an appropriate 
level remains an important aspect of good governance (Solomon & 
Solomon, 2004: 80). As per recommendations of many governance codes of 
conduct throughout, many companies have established remuneration 
committees to deal effectively with this issue.  The recent example of the 
charismatic leader of the New York Stock Exchange, Richard Grasso clearly 
shows that executive pay should remain an issue for a very long time to 
come. Grasso’s remuneration was determined by the remuneration 
committee which was constituted in terms of the codes of best practices 
relating to good governance. Moreover, the recommendations of this 
committee were adopted by a twenty seven member board comprising of 
independent and non-executive members as would be the requirement of 
any governance code (Kuseni, 2003). 
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As alluded to earlier, entrepreneurial organisations may not even have 
established boards, let alone remuneration committees. This means that the 
executive remuneration remains a high challenge in the SME sector. 
 
2.6.2 Abuse, fraud and unethical conduct 
 
An Ernst and Young fraud survey in 1998 revealed that 80 per cent of 
companies surveyed in Africa had experienced fraud in the preceding year 
(Rossouw, 2002: 157).  What has characterised most corporate collapses is 
the extent of corrupt, greed and self-serving individuals who are bent of 
abusing public trust and organisational resources to advance their self 
enrichment (Kuseni, 2004). This was the case with the recent collapse of the 
Italian $17 Billion conglomerate, Parmalat. The question is how this was 
possible in the face of statutory requirements for auditing and accounting 
practices. 
 
2.6.3 Global convergence 
 
There are as many governance systems as there are countries in the world 
(Solomon & Solomon, 2004: 147). These systems and codes of governance 
are determined by a variety of issues like ownership structures, government 
policies, legal systems, culture and history of those countries (Solomon & 
Solomon, 2004: 147). This becomes a problem in the light of a borderless 
society in that companies need to conform and comply with different and 
varying codes of good governance. 
 
2.6.4 Creative accounting 
 
There is a tendency on the part of executives to manipulate earnings 
through creative accounting techniques. Such measures include book 
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transfers of inventory, keeping debt off balance sheets, writing up assets, 
and selective booking of income and expenses (Kaen, 2003: 51).  
 
The executives cannot do this alone. They need the assistance of the 
auditing firms and many people have proposed that there is a need to 
protect the auditors from the directors. The role Andersen played in the 
Enron saga, where Enron kept the debt away from the balance sheet is 
indicative of this situation. The looseness of accounting standards, and 
competitive pressures both on companies and auditors made it difficult for 
auditors to stand up to demanding boards (Cadbury Committee, 1992: 14). 
 
2.6.5 Unfettered powers of chief executive officers and executive directors 
 
Separation of the roles of chairman and chief executive is preferred or 
otherwise companies must justify a decision to combine the roles (King 
Report on corporate governance, 2002: 53). This is to ensure that no 
individual has unfettered powers in the decision making process of an 
organisation. The splitting of roles is a governance initiative to reduce the 
agency problem since there is more opportunity for independent decision 
making (Solomon & Solomon, 2004: 67).  
 
The King Report on corporate governance (2002: 50) recommends that the 
board should comprise a balance of executive and non-executive directors, 
preferably with a majority non-executive. A senior non-executive director to 
whom concerns can be conveyed should be identified in the annual report. 
Non-executive directors should be individuals of calibre and credibility who 
have the necessary skills and experience to bring about independent 
judgement (King Report on corporate governance, 2002: 60). Hence, names 
of directors submitted for re-election should be accompanied by biographical 
details (King Report on corporate governance, 2002: 51). 
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The powers of executives remain a big governance challenge, since poor 
governance judgement continues unabated despite the creation of these 
structures. The ex-vice chairman of Coca-Cola pleaded guilty in 2001 to 
concealing expenses at Aurora Foods (Kaen, 2003: 52). The unfettered 
powers of executives has always been a challenge to big businesses and is 
even a bigger challenge in the SME sector since there are heavy costs 
attached to creating the control structures discussed above. This challenge 
is exacerbated by the fact that the SMEs may not even have the capacity to 
attract the calibre of individuals required to bring about this independent 
judgement. 
 
2.6.6 Shareholder activism  
 
The key factor influencing shareholder activism is the resources the 
investors have. Solomon and Solomon (2004: 112) conducted interviews 
with institutional investors and established that larger institutions are more 
proactive in good governance than smaller institutions. The King Report on 
corporate governance (2002:164) declares that there is a lack of 
shareholder activism in South Africa despite some very serious undesirable 
and poor governance practices by South African companies.  
 
2.6.7 Corporate governance and corporate performance  
 
One of the important drivers of commitment to good governance would be 
its ability to have a demonstrable positive relationship and financial 
performance, although there is growing evidence to indicate that there is a 
significant statistical relationship between bad governance and poor 
financial performance (Solomon & Solomon, 2004: 63). According to Merritt 
and Lavelle (2004: 46) Dalton, who studied governance for about 25 years, 
concluded in his research that board independence, the separation of CEO 
and chairman roles, equity holding by executive directors, do not lead to an 
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improved financial performance of an organisation. Many organisations 
including SMEs have not proactively embraced good governance systems 
because they are not seen as a value adding activity. 
 
2.7 SUMMARY 
 
In this chapter the researcher has looked at the historical perspective of good 
governance and its fundamental drivers. The relevance of good governance in 
today's business was discussed with particular emphasis on why good governance 
continues to occupy every business person’s mind. An overview of the element of 
good governance and good governance characteristics was discussed followed by 
good governance challenges.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE ROLE, RELEVANCE AND CHALLENGES OF THE SME SECTOR IN THE 
SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Many academics and individuals both in the public and private sectors have 
consistently made claims that the SME sector should play a meaningful role in 
reducing unemployment, creating countless business opportunities and boosting 
the economy (SMEs - Key to joblessness, 2003). The government acknowledges 
that if it is to achieve its desired objectives of long-term economic growth and 
sustainable development, the growth and development of the SME sector has got 
to be the government’s priority (Malgas, 2003: 5). It follows therefore that the 
engine of the much desired development of the South African economy is the 
development and sustaining of SMEs.  
 
In advancing the case for the SME development, comparisons are made with other 
First World countries such as Italy and the USA, where the SME sector is a 
dynamic money-and-jobs generator (SMEs - Key to joblessness, 2003). The socio-
economic conditions, the low levels of literacy and the education structure itself do 
not augur well for the development of an entrepreneurial culture in South Africa 
(SMEs- Key to joblessness, 2003). This challenge means that the SMEs will not be 
as successful as would be expected in the long-term in both job creation and 
contribution to the economic activity. Karunga et al (2000: 6) concur and estimate 
that five out of eight jobs created by SMEs are again lost in the same year. 
 
Over and above dealing with a complex tax regime, restrictive labour legislation, 
industry or sector legislation, the skills development requirements and many more, 
the SMEs are still expected to operate in accordance with acceptable governance 
standards. The scourge of many SMEs collapsing is very serious considering that 
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there are just over 4 000 organisations that are de-registered annually Companies 
and Intellectual Property Registration Office, 2004). This figure does not take into 
account the fact that some SMEs that have just been registered may be dormant. If 
SMEs are a crucial element of government’s commitment to sustainable 
development and economic growth, then a lot has to be done to ensure that SMEs 
are nurtured and built to last for a very long time. 
 
In this chapter an overview of the South African economy, its structure and relevant 
trends is given. This is immediately followed by profiling the SME sector through a 
brief analysis of its growth, contribution to the Gross Domestic Production (GDP), 
employment creation and so on. The role of the SMEs and their economic 
relevance is discussed in detail. Lastly, the constraints of and challenges to SMEs 
immediately followed by the corresponding opportunities are discussed.  
 
3.2 AN OVERVIEW OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY 
 
The South African economy performed well in the last quarter of 2002 with a year-
on-year growth rate of 3,1 per cent in comparison with the industrialised economies 
like Germany and United Kingdom who achieved 2 per cent and 1 per cent 
respectively (Ntsika Annual Review, 2002: 19). This spectacular performance was 
largely due to the depreciation of the South African currency leading to price 
competitiveness of South African goods and services in the international markets. 
However, despite the appreciation of the South African currency since the 
beginning 2002, the growth momentum has continued to date.  
 
Table 3.1 shows the economic growth rates of four Industrial Nations and three 
Developing Nations against South Africa for 2002 and 2003, including the 
projections for 2004. The average is for the selected countries only. In terms of 
Table 3.1 the South African economy continued to show an economic growth rate 
of 3,6 per cent and 1,9 per cent in 2002 and 2003 respectively. Again comparing 
with the industrialised economies and some developing economies, South Africa 
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did very well, performing better than the average of the selected countries in 2002. 
In 2003 South Africa again performed better than the average of the Advanced 
Economies and only marginally less than the average of the Developing Nations. 
Although South Africa in terms of Table 3.1 is the second only to India, it performed 
lower than the average of the developing nations because of the extremely high 
growth India showed.  
 
South Africa is well on track for performing better than the International Monetary 
Fund projections of 2,6 per cent. This is so because the annualised percentage 
change in seasonally adjusted real Gross Domestic Product at market prices for 
the second quarter of 2004 was recorded as 3,9 per cent and the first quarter was 
3,6 percent (Statistics South Africa, 2004 a). 
 
Table 3.1: Economic growth rate of various countries  
Country 2002 
Actual (%) 
2003 
Actual (%) 
2004 
Projection (%) 
United States 1,9 3 4,3 
Germany 0,1 -0,1 2 
United Kingdom 1,8 2,2 3,4 
France 1,1 0.5 2,6 
Average advanced 
economies 
1,2 1,4 3,1 
India  5 7,2 6,4 
Brazil 1,9 -0,2 4 
Mexico 0,8 1,3 4 
South Africa 3,6 1,9 2,6 
Average developing 
economies 
2,8 2,6 4,3 
Source: Adapted from International Monetary Fund, 2004: 3 
 
There are five macro-economic objectives against which the performance of any 
country’s economy can be measured. These are full employment, the economic 
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growth, price stability, balance of payments and an equitable distribution of income 
(Mohr, 2001: 3).  
 
The first macro-economic objective to be discussed is what is referred to as full 
employment. Full employment is probably not possible to achieve, but the idea is to 
keep the unemployment levels as low as possible (Mohr, 2001: 78). According to 
the Labour Force Survey (2003), there are approximately 16,2 million people who 
are economically active of which 11,6 million are employed and 4,6 million are 
unemployed. This gives an official unemployment rate of 28,2 per cent.  
 
The official unemployment rate in 2003 showed a significant decrease compared to 
the previous year’s Labour Force Survey (2002), which was 30,2 per cent. This 
decrease in the unemployment rate should be viewed together with the increase in 
the number of people who are not economically active. This could imply that 
certain unemployed people are no longer seeking employment due to frustration of 
not finding employment and therefore, are no longer classified as economically 
active. Labour absorption capacity of the South African economy is said to have 
declined from an average of 75 per cent during the period 1965-1970 to about 12,5 
per cent during the period 1985-1989 (Mohr, 2001: 87). This means that only about 
13 out of every 100 new entrants were able to secure full time employment 
between 1985 and 1989. During the period 2000 and 2003, the labour absorption 
rate was estimated at an average of 40,3 per cent which is still very low, although it 
is a significant improvement on the 12,5 per cent (Department of Labour, 2003: 
38).  
 
The second macro-economic objective to be considered is economic growth. Many 
economic analysts and academics project that SA needs to achieve an annual 
economic growth of 5 to 6 per cent consecutively over a minimum of five years if it 
is to turn the tide against poverty and unemployment (Ntsika Annual Review, 2001: 
54). According to Statistics South Africa (2004a) the real GDP continues to rise. 
The seasonally adjusted real GDP at market prices for the second quarter of 2004, 
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compared with the first quarter of 2004, increased by an annualised rate of 3,9 
percent.  
The main contributors to the increase in economic activity for the second quarter of 
2004 were the manufacturing industry (1 per cent); transport and communication 
industry (0,7 per cent); finance, real estate and business services industry (0,7 per 
cent); wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants industry (0,5 per cent) and 
agriculture, forestry and fishing industry (0,3 per cent) (Statistics South Africa, 
2004a). 
The third macro-economic objective is price stability which relates to the official 
inflation rate which was 1,6 per cent in July 2004. This rate is 0,4 per cent higher 
than the corresponding annual rate of 1,2 per cent in June 2004.  Although this 
calculation was done for the first two quarters of the year, it is not bad considering 
that in 2002 it was 5,8 per cent and in 2001 it was as high as 9,2 per cent 
(Statistics South Africa, 2004a). The preceding years and in particular 2001 
including the early part of 2002, was characterised by high volatility of the 
exchange rate. That volatility could partly be the explanation for the high inflation 
rate, but it must be said that the South African Rand has stabilised again. 
 
The fourth macro-economic objective is the balance of payments which relates to 
all South Africa’s international transactions with the rest of the world and more 
importantly, the imports and exports (Mohr, 2001: 128). The depreciation of the 
South African currency contributed to the price competitiveness of the South 
African goods on international markets and that meant more exports. In 2001 
South Africa recorded a trade surplus of close to R42 billion, about 4,3 per cent of 
the GDP and in 2002 it narrowed down to 3,4 per cent of GDP (Ntsika Annual 
Review, 2002: 24). There have been complaints from the exporting industries that 
the strengthening of the South African currency is hampering their ability to export 
and as such these businesses may be forced to retrench some of their employees. 
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Lastly, an equitable distribution of income which relates to the distribution of 
national income among individuals, groups, sectors, regions of South Africa is 
discussed. Given the legacy of apartheid, South Africa is grappling with this big 
challenge.  
 
Despite nearly a decade of positive economic growth, the South African 
unemployment figure remains a major challenge. The International Monetary Fund 
(as quoted by Ntsika Annual Review, 2002: 19) declared that the major policy 
challenge facing South Africa is the quest for a high economic growth and lower 
unemployment rate. The SMEs are viewed as the panacea to address the high 
levels of unemployment, income inequality, economic concentration, the lack or 
inadequate international competitiveness and economic growth (Chalmers, 2003: 
4).   
 
3.3 SME SECTOR PROFILE 
 
The role of SMEs in stimulating economic growth and unemployment can never be 
underestimated. However, if the government is to achieve the desired results it 
must instil the entrepreneurial culture amongst its citizens. SMEs should not be the 
preserve of the unemployed and retrenched people. There should be incentives to 
attract even senior managers and professionals from the corporate sector. In 
profiling the South African SME sector the discussion will cover the following sub-
headings: 
 
3.3.1 Contribution to the GDP 
Table 3.2 shows the contributions made to the GDP by size, which is micro, 
small, medium and large. Table 3.2 shows that large firms dominate with a 
contribution of 63,9 per cent whilst the SMEs accounted for 30,2 per cent. 
The SME sector contribution increased from 28,9 per cent in 2001, while the 
large firms’ contribution decreased from 65,2 per cent (Ntsika Annual 
Review, 2001: 41). 
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Table 3.2: Estimated percentage sectoral contribution to GDP by size, 2002 
MICRO SMALL MEDIUM LARGE TOTAL  
              SECTOR % % % % % 
Agriculture, forestry & fishing 3,4 9,2 43,8 43,6 100 
Mining & quarrying 1,6 1,9 2,8 93,7 100 
Manufacturing 4,9 7,5 21,2 66,4 100 
Construction 2,8 32,5 14,7 50 100 
Trade, catering & accommodation 4,2 24,6 12,1 59,1 100 
Transport, storage & communication 8,8 19,1 20,2 51,9 100 
Community, social, finance & business 
service 
15,7 13,9 2,6 67,8 100 
TOTAL 5,9 14,8 15,4 63,9 100 
Source: Ntsika Annual Review, 2002: 35 
 
3.3.2 Contribution to employment creation 
Table 3.3 shows that SMEs are responsible for 36,5 per cent of employment 
comparing with large firms which contribute 31,8 per cent. The employment 
contribution by large firms has drastically decreased by 14,3 per cent in the 
space of one year from 46,1 per cent in 2001 (Ntsika Annual Review, 2001: 
41). 
 
Table 3.3: Distribution of private sector employment by size 
Sector % of total private sector employment 
Survivalist 10,9 
Micro 20,8 
Small 24,2 
Medium 12,3 
Large 31,8 
TOTAL 100 
Source: Adapted from Ntsika Annual Review, 2002: 36 
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3.3.3 Registrations and de-registrations 
Table 3.4 shows that there has been a huge influx of new entrants 
throughout various sectors of the economy. In 2003 alone about 143 000 
new businesses were registered compared to about 140 000 in 2002. In 
2003 about 4300 business were liquidated. This number of liquidations is 
fairly high considering that there are just more than one million active 
businesses in the South African economy (Companies and Intellectual 
Property Registrations Office, 2004).   
Table 3.4: Companies and close corporations registration and 
deregistration  
Product 2001 2002 2003 May 2004 
New companies 30 186   32 174    31 753 13 574 
New CC's 86 396 107 300 110 723 51 826 
Company liquidations   2 009     2 093     1 176      445 
CC liquidations   2 481     1 683     3 154      436 
Source: Adapted from Companies and Intellectual Property Registrations     
             Office, 2004   
 
3.3.4 Regional contribution 
Table 3.5 shows the distribution of enterprises by size throughout the nine 
provinces. In terms of this table, the larger the size of the provincial 
economy, the greater is the proportion of large entities in that province. The 
three provinces (Gauteng, Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal) with the 
largest economies have the largest number of SMEs. This assertion is true 
except for the Eastern Cape and Limpopo Provinces, where the small and 
micro enterprises are greater in numbers in the Limpopo Province followed 
by the Eastern Cape Province. The Limpopo Province dominates the small 
and micro enterprises with 43,5 per cent and 34,6 respectively. It should be 
noted that over the period 1996 until 2002 the Limpopo Province recorded 
an average real annual economic growth rate of 4 per cent higher than that 
of South Africa, which is 2,8 per cent (Statistics South Africa, 2004a). This 
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could further explain the role and contribution made by SMEs to the 
economy. 
 
Table 3.5: Provincial share of enterprises by size 
Survivalist Micro Small Medium Large Province 
% % % % % 
Actual Total 
Gauteng 19,6 12,2 13,9 45,4 49,3 687 591 
Western Cape 8,6 11,2 6.9 16,3 11,8 187 494 
KwaZulu-Natal 6,1 2,1 1,7 16,9 17,9 145 282 
Mpumalanga 21,7 4,2 5,2 5,7 4,7 80 144 
Eastern Cape 9,8 20,1 17,9 5,1 6,4 57 535 
Free State 5,4 4,9 3,9 3,3 5,6 32 069 
Limpopo  20,8 34,6 43,5 2,4 4,8 24 639 
North West 6,5 4,2 4,3 3,1 2,5 21 433 
Northern Cape 1,5 6,4 2,7 1,2 1,7 9 366 
RSA 100 100 100 100 100 1 245 553 
Source: Adapted from Ntsika Annual Review, 2002: 43 
 
3.4 THE ROLE AND ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF SMEs 
 
According to the Department of Trade and Industry (as quoted by Matiso, 2003: 
29) the role of SMEs can be explained as follows: 
 
3.4.1 Employment creation 
SMEs are credited with creating employment at the time when the large 
enterprises are retrenching their employees. Although South Africa has 
seen positive economic growth for the last few years, unemployment has 
not decreased at the same pace. Matiso (2003: 29) argues that the SME 
sector often requires little or limited skills from the candidate employees. 
These new employees are often trained in-house by the SMEs. South Africa 
is said to be going through what economists call a jobless growth, where the 
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positive economic growth does not translate into new employment 
opportunities. Other commentators argue that South Africa does not have a 
major unemployment problem but rather a skills mismatch. While South 
African companies are in desperate need of skilled employees, there are 
hundreds of graduates who are unemployed whose skills are neither 
relevant nor required in the working environment. This is often called 
educated unemployment or structural unemployment (McGrath, 2003: 59).  
 
The recently qualified graduates do not necessary possess the relevant 
skills and knowledge for the working environments. On the other hand the 
large enterprises require skills and experience prior to employment. Often 
SMEs do not require highly sophisticated skill levels at entry level or if they 
do, may not have sufficient resources to recruit and retain the services of 
the highly skilled individuals. This forces SMEs to employ relatively unskilled 
and untrained people with the hope of giving them in-house training. The 
SMEs by so doing help bridge this experience gap, although these 
employees once trained are again poached by the large organisations since 
there is a scarcity of skilled people.  
 
3.4.2 Poverty alleviation 
Reading from Table 3.5, the Mpumalanga and Limpopo Provinces each 
have more than 20 per cent share of the survivalist enterprises. It should be 
noted that survivalist is also referred to as forced self-employment (Kesper, 
2000: 1). More often the inexperienced and unskilled job seekers as result 
of inability to attain employment, would engage in the survivalist activities 
such as starting a micro enterprise. This high ratio of survivalist firms mirrors 
the high poverty ratio in these provinces (Ntsika Annual Review, 2002: 43).  
 
The Eastern Cape Province is one of the poorest provinces, but has few 
survivalist enterprises, only 9,8 per cent of the total number of enterprises in 
the country. This observation should be noted against the background that 
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the Eastern Cape Province has the second largest number of micro (20,1 
per cent) and small (17,9 per cent) enterprises after the Limpopo Province 
(see Table 3.5).   
 
3.4.3 Income re-distribution 
The SME sector is seen by the government as one of the vehicles to be 
used to redress the income inequalities of the past through ownership 
patterns and employment opportunities for black people who were 
previously discriminated against (Kesper, 2000: 1). Black people were 
denied entry in certain occupations and were subjected to poor education as 
compared to their white counterparts. Out of about 42 000 engineering 
professionals in South Africa, there are only 2 915 Black (Indian, Coloured 
and African) professionals (Department of Labour, 2003: 33). This apartheid 
legacy does not only lead to serious income disparities between black and 
white people, but also the inability of black people to enter these 
occupations.  
 
It should be noted that the previous South African political system is not the 
only contributor to the income inequalities to be found in the country. Some 
economists have observed a significant decline in the income of the lowest 
paid employees throughout the world (Hill, 2003: 26). This decline is 
attributed to the shift in production methods from manual labour to highly 
sophisticated technological methods (Hill, 2003: 26). This renders the 
unskilled workers unemployable; hence many economies have an 
oversupply of unskilled workers with a corresponding shortage of skilled 
workers (Hill, 2003: 26).  
 
Since most SMEs do not use these sophisticated production methods and 
are spread throughout the country including rural areas they will be able to 
create endless opportunities for unskilled employees. This will ensure that 
the country’s wealth is shared by all who live in it. 
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3.4.4 Contribution to investment 
Admittedly there is little information in this area of SME contribution but 
Abedian (1998, as quoted by Berry, Von Blottnitz, Cassim, Kesper, 
Rajaratnam and Van Seventer, 2002: 29), claims that SMEs show very low 
investment behaviour compared to their contribution to the total 
employment. This is attributed to the difficulty the SMEs have in accessing 
business finance in order to undertake investment. The SME contribution to 
the national gross investment is just about 25,5 per cent of the total share 
(Berry et al, 2002: 36). The biggest recipient of the SME investment-spend 
is the manufacturing sector which received about 36 per cent of the total 
investment of SMEs (Berry et al, 2002: 36).  The only sector the SMEs 
dominate in the investment spend is in wholesale, retail trade, catering and 
accommodation with a staggering 70 per cent compared to large firms with 
only 30 per cent (Berry et al, 2002: 36).  
 
3.4.5 Democratisation of economic participation 
Given the particular history of South Africa, the government has taken a 
view that the economic participation needs to be broadened to include the 
majority which was previously disadvantaged (PDI). The PDI ownership of 
SMEs was estimated at about 50 per cent in 1997 and in 2001 it had 
increased to about 76,8 per cent (Berry et al, 2002: 26). This is a significant 
increase and considering that some SMEs may grow in size to become big 
businesses, the SME sector can be a viable vehicle for democratisation of 
economic participation. 
 
3.4.6 Promote competition 
SMEs are known to always carry low overheads. As a result they can 
rejuvenate the competitiveness of the markets in which they operate. SMEs 
create their own market niches in which they grow until they identify new 
niches as a response to demand changes (Kesper, 2000: 8). 
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3.4.7 Contribution to the national product 
SMEs contribute to the national product by producing valuable goods 
through provision of services to both the consumers and other enterprises. 
SMEs are not just suppliers of goods and services, but also are consumers 
of both industrial and consumer products. This helps stimulate the demand 
for both consumption and capital goods (Berry et al, 2002: 36). Table 3.2 
showed that the SME sector contributes about 30,2 per cent to the GDP. 
 
3.4.8 Economic growth and development 
Economic growth and development can be achieved through improved 
competitiveness on the one hand and through employment creation and 
income re-distribution driven by economic growth on the other (Small 
Business Project, 2003: 2). The SME sector credited with its ability to help 
achieve these macro economic objectives, is well placed to contribute to the 
economic growth and development. According to the Ntsika Annual Review 
(2002: 37), SMEs represent about 40,9 per cent of the total private sector 
enterprises in the country. More importantly, the sectors that contributed to 
the economic growth rate of the second quarter of 2004 have a fair 
representation of SMEs (see Paragraph 3.2). The manufacturing industry 
has 36 per cent of SMEs, the transport and communication industry has 32 
per cent, the finance, real estate and business services industry has 46 per 
cent, the wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants industry has 36 
per cent and agriculture, forestry and fishing industry has 58 per cent 
(Ntsika Annual Review, 2002: 38). 
 
3.5 THE CASE FOR SME SECTOR DEVELOPMENT 
 
3.5.1 Labour absorption capacity 
It is often suggested that the jobless growth and the mismatch of supply and 
demand of unskilled jobs (i.e. structural unemployment) can be addressed 
by a robust economic growth in South Africa (Berry et al, 2002: 36). The 
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growth in employment by the SME sector is considerably faster that the 
growth in the contribution by SMEs to the GDP (Ntsika Annual Review, 
2002: 36). In 1995 the employment contribution by the SME sector was 1,35 
times greater than the contribution to GDP (Ntsika Annual Review, 2002: 
36). This factor increased in 2001 to 1,5. This does not only indicate the 
high levels of labour absorption capacity by SMEs, but also the job creation 
potential of the SME sector (Ntsika Annual Review, 2002: 36). 
 
3.5.2 Capital cost per job 
SMEs are targeted for the creation of employment and general economic 
growth and social progress purely because of the low capital requirements 
per job created (Ntsika Annual Review, 2002: 54). This means that 
government intervention as it relates to employment creation would be more 
effective and efficient if driven by SMEs. SACOB (1999: 6) argues that the 
average capital cost per job created in SMEs is one fifth of that required for 
large business in the same category. 
 
3.5.3 Easy to adapt 
SMEs are naturally structured in such a way that allows for the kind of 
flexibility globalisation demands of all businesses. The increase in 
international trade and cross border investments as a result of globalisation, 
will ultimately lead to lower prices of goods and services and more 
importantly, increase the choice of products available in the market (Hill, 
2003: 22). Hill (2003: 24) further argues that when a country embraces free 
trade, there is always some dislocation which requires organisations to 
change the way they do business.  
 
As a consequence of globalisation many organisations have to unbundle, 
relocate their manufacturing plants to countries with lower wage costs, 
modify their products for the export market, engage in productivity 
improvement exercise or engage in any exercise that will ensure survival. 
 71 
These on-going changes have to take place in a short space of time and 
large organisations do not necessarily have that kind of flexibility.  On the 
other hand SMEs can adapt to the changing changing consumer demands 
at a relatively lower cost and at the required speed. 
 
3.5.4 Opportunities for the unemployed 
SMEs create endless opportunities for the unemployed both in terms of 
employment and starting own businesses. The employment creation is even 
more important in that SMEs employ inexperienced and low skilled 
employees with a view of giving them in-house training. Although the access 
to finance can be seen as the barrier to entry, many entrepreneurs have 
started their thriving businesses without any finance. Table 3.2 earlier 
showed that SMEs account for 36,5 per cent of employment compared to 
31,8 per cent of the large organisations. 
 
3.5.5 Skills requirements  
Michael Lake, the EU ambassador to South Africa (as quoted by Jackson, 
1997: 30), declared that it is not enough just to have a limited number of 
graduates and professionals in a developing country. If South Africa is to 
grow and compete effectively in the global village, it needs every citizen to 
learn new skills and techniques every day. The SME sector has a wide 
reach and is deeply rooted in the communities and, therefore, is specifically 
suited to perpetuate the life-long learning process. Moreover entry 
requirements for employment at an SME level are normally not as high as 
those of large entities. It follows, therefore, that SMEs will give people, who 
have limited or no skills at all, an opportunity of employment and a chance 
to learn. This would improve the skills base of the country’s workforce and 
more importantly, contribute to the reduction of the structural 
unemployment.     
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3.5.6 Aid to big business 
Most businesses in their quest for global competitiveness have to outsource 
their non-core business activities. It should be remembered that different 
organisations have different core competencies. A core competence, 
according to Hill (2003: 414), is a skill within the firm that competitors cannot 
easily match or imitate. There is variety of different SMEs with different core 
competencies and the non-core business activities of one large organisation 
could be provided by a specialist in that field.  
 
SABMiller’s core competency is managing breweries in emerging markets. 
However, training their sales representatives could be other business core 
competence, as would be organising product launches and so on. 
Globalisation forces all organisations to be competitive and efficient and to 
achieve. That it means organisations not only have to know their 
competencies, but must focus all their energies on them. The SMEs 
because of their flexibility and competitiveness, are able to provide the non-
core business activities in terms of both quality and price competitiveness. 
 
3.5.7 Vital role in innovation 
Matiso (2003: 38) claims that many scientific breakthroughs have originated 
from within small organisations. Studies on the role of SMEs in innovation 
by Longenecker et al (1997, as quoted by Matiso, 2003: 39) further confirms 
that there is a greater effectiveness of small firms in research and 
development. Photocopiers, insulator, power steering, colour film, vacuum 
cube, and penicillin are amongst the few new products created by SMEs in 
the twentieth century (Matiso, 2003: 38). 
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3.6 THE SME CHALLENGES AND CONSTRAINTS 
 
3.6.1 Business finance 
The development of SMEs is constrained by the lack of access to loan and 
retail finance. There are many sectors that believe that unlike many African 
countries, finance per se is not a critical problem in South Africa. What is 
challenging is accessing the capital itself.  Given the legacy of apartheid, the 
majority of people were not allowed to own fixed assets that would enhance 
their chances of accessing finance (Karunga et al, 2000: 7).  
 
3.6.2 Management capacity 
One of the biggest challenges of the entrepreneurs is the lack of know-how 
and expertise in running and operating business. The expertise of an 
entrepreneur would always be more on the specific product, but lack the 
skills to market it and have inadequate capacity to develop a management 
system to run the business efficiently. 
  
3.6.3 Taxation 
The lack of or insufficient tax incentives available to SMEs do impact 
negatively on the cash flow of the SMEs. The complexity of the tax system 
and the regressive nature of the VAT do place a huge compliance burden 
on the SMEs (Blignaut & Demana, 2002: 6).   
 
3.6.4 Complex labour legislation 
The cost of labour, difficulty in complying with labour laws and lack of 
flexibility when determining wage setting are but a few constraints and 
challenges to the SMEs (Blignaut & Demana, 2002: 5). SACOB (1999: 3) 
claims that SME owners and managers perceive the prevailing legislation 
governing labour practices to be excessively onerous, to the point where 
such businesses are actively looking at ways to reduce their current 
employees. Those SMEs with lesser number of employees are reluctant to 
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allow their employees to grow beyond the number that allows them 
exemptions from certain provisions of certain legislation (SACOB, 1999: 4). 
SACOB (1999: 5) recommends that any review of the regulatory 
environment should first identify which regulations constitute the most 
significant constraints to small business growth and development.  
 
3.6.5 Sectoral trade legislation 
There are a lot of strict requirements in terms of sectoral trade practices as 
determined by government legislation. In the private security industry, estate 
agency and debt collectors, the SMEs are in the majority in these sectors, 
All these sectors have statutory industry boards or councils that regulate the 
industry. There are levies to be paid monthly to finance the activities of 
these councils and some requirements are just too burdensome for SME 
development. In the Private Security Industry for instance, there is a 
minimum monthly subscription of R285-00 and thereafter for every 
employee an extra R7-98 is payable monthly by the business after a once-
off application fee of R4 560-00 has been paid. This monthly subscription 
has to be paid whether the registered security business is operational or not 
(Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority, 2004). This can create 
serious entry barriers for SMEs in the industry and more importantly, failure 
on the part of the already registered business to pay, results in its certificate 
to operate being withdrawn immediately (Private Security Industry 
Regulatory Authority, 2004). 
 
3.6.6 Public procurement 
The government is using its buying power to target SMEs through what is 
referred to as affirmative procurement. This targeted procurement is used in 
many ways by government to support its wide range macro-economic 
policies and objectives including SME development (Ntsika Annual Review, 
2002: 76). However, the complex tendering procedure for government 
business, the corrupt officials, inaccessibility of tendering information are 
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major constraints to the development of SMEs. (Blignaut & Demana, 2002: 
5). Sometimes the adjudication criteria like performance bonds, proof of 
infrastructure prior to awarding of contract and public liability insurances 
may actually be an access barrier to a lot of SMEs in these government 
contracts (Ntsika Annual Review, 2002: 111). 
  
3.6.7 Globalisation 
South Africa as a full member of the World Trade Organisation which 
advocates the reduction of barriers to cross-border trade and investment 
has no option but to reduce or remove completely its import tariffs (Hill, 
2003: 191). The scrapping of import tariffs means that many SMEs are no 
longer protected from international competitors. As a result the market is 
shrinking 
 
3.7 OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE SME SECTOR  
 
3.7.1 Skills development 
Jackson (2003: 28) argues that the key thrust of the National Skills 
Development Strategy (NSDS) is to ensure that the skills development is 
responsive to the skills requirements of the industry, including SMEs. This 
commitment is as a result of recognition on the part of government that skills 
development could unlock the potential of many thousands of small 
businesses and entrepreneurs.  
 
The NSDS is underpinned by three core pieces of legislation, namely the 
South African Qualifications Act, the Skills Development Act and the Skills 
Development Levies act. In terms of the Skills Development Act, 25 Setas 
were created to fast-tract skills development in all sectors of the South 
African economy (Department of Labour, 2004). 
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The NSDS has five key objectives and each is accompanied by a series of 
success indicators by which each seta’s performance in promoting and 
implementing the skills development programmes would be measured 
against (Jackson, 2003: 29). One of these objectives is stimulating and 
supporting skills development in the small businesses. The success 
indicator is that by March 2005 about 20 per cent of new and existing 
business should be supported in skills development initiatives (Jackson, 
2003: 28).   
 
3.7.2 Financing opportunities 
The government through the Department of Trade and industry (DTI), has 
created a parastatal called Khula Enterprise Finance with government as 
the major shareholder. Khula’s mandate is to facilitate loan and equity 
capital to SMEs through the medium of Retail Financial Intermediaries, 
providing guarantees to the banks and equity finance. There are various 
other government interventions like Umsobomvu Youth Fund (UYF) which is 
geared towards facilitating finance for the youth in business.   
 
The provincial governments have their own financing institutions to facilitate 
local economic development for an example the Eastern Cape Development 
Corporation (ECDC) in the Eastern Cape Province. The banks have 
followed suit in creating finance packages that are accessible to the SMEs. 
 
3.7.3 Taxation 
In the Budget Speech 2004/5 (2004), the Minister increased the limit for the 
annual turnover of small business to R5 million from R3 million the previous 
year. This means that small businesses that have a turnover of not more 
than R5 million are liable to pay 15 per cent for the first R150 000-00 and 
thereafter 30 per cent on the amount exceeding R150 000-00. This is an 
achievement considering that the normal company income tax is 30 per 
cent.  
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3.7.4 Labour legislation 
The Skills Development Act and Employment Equity Act are aimed at 
improving both the quality and quantity of the labour force supply (SACOB, 
1999: 3). As discussed in Paragraph 3.7.1, the SME sector will be the 
primary beneficiary of any development of the labour supply. According to 
the department of labour as quoted by Matiso (2003: 23), the government 
identified five policy imperatives whose success is dependant on the review 
of all labour legislation. Two of these policies included promotion and 
development of small businesses and the creation of jobs. This led to the 
promulgation of the Labour Law Amendment Act in 2002 (Department of 
Labour, August 2004).  
 
3.7.5 Sectoral trade legislation 
There are various other pieces of legislation that affect the development of 
SMEs other than the labour legislation as mentioned in paragraph 3.6.5. 
Again picking up on the Private Security Industry Regulatory Act, its 
intended purpose is to promote a security industry which is characterised by 
the highest level of professionalism, transparency, accountability and 
accessibility and more importantly, create stability in the only private sector 
industry that has a lot of firearms in their possession (Private Security 
Industry Regulatory Authority, 2004). These are noble intentions. Although 
they may have some unintended consequences in the main, these pieces of 
legislation do create a stable environment in which all SMEs can operate 
freely. 
 
3.7.6 Globalisation 
According to Birdlife South Africa (2004) in a paper prepared for the 
Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, 
globalisation could be described as the free exchange of capital (money), 
information, people and ideas across the world. It goes further to say it is 
free in the sense that these processes are not under the control of any state, 
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organisation or company, but free trade takes place within the framework 
set by the World Trade Organization (WTO). This means that critical niche 
markets are no longer controlled by the powerful conglomerates and SMEs 
can now participate in the international trade with ease. The SMEs can now 
have access to markets all over the world without huge capital outlays as a 
result of the internet technology.  
 
3.8 SUMMARY 
 
The aim of this chapter was to attempt to explain the economic relevance of SMEs 
in the South African economy.  The South African economy with a particular focus 
on its macro-economic objectives was briefly discussed. Having established the 
economic context within which SMEs operate, the SME sector was profiled in 
terms of its contribution to the economic activity of the country.  
 
The role and economic relevance of SMEs was discussed in detail followed by an 
argument for SME sector development. Finally, the discussion was on what 
challenges and constrains the SME sector growth and development, immediately 
followed by the corresponding opportunities.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
EMPIRICAL STUDY AND METHOD USED 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The empirical approach to knowledge contends that the sole criteria for 
judging a statement of fact is whether or not it coincides with currently held 
observations (Herbert, 1990: 12). Herbert (1990: 13) further maintains that if 
the statement coincides with current observation, then it should be accepted 
and if it does not, it should be repudiated. As per the literature survey, it has 
transpired that there could be major challenges and constraints in so far as 
the SME sector conforming and complying with good governance principles 
and practices is concerned.   
 
This chapter will be concerned with explaining the method to be used in 
collecting and interpreting the data or observations about the SME’s 
conformance and implementation of good governance principles and 
practices in the Port Elizabeth CBD.  
 
4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Research is distinguished from experience and reasoning by its systematic, 
controlled and empirical approach in its operations (Matiso, 2003: 50). 
Allison, O’Sullivan, Owen, Rice, Rothwell and Saunders (1996: 4) define 
research as a systematic enquiry which is reported in a form that allows the 
research methods and the outcomes to be accessible to others. The 
research design is about the planning of the research procedure and the 
procedure on data collection and analyses.  
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The following is the systematic enquiry used in attempting to resolve the 
main problem using a basic format of the research process (Leedy, 2001: 
92): 
• Defining the research problem 
In Chapter One, the research problem  and its sub-problems were 
clearly stated. The importance of resolving the research problem and 
the research limitations were also discussed. 
 
• Hypothesis 
A hypothesis is a logical supposition, a reasonable guess or an 
educated conjecture that provides a tentative explanation for a 
phenomenon under investigation (Leedy, 2001: 6). There is a general 
observation that many SMEs are not conforming to good governance 
practices. The following is a series of reasonable guesses or 
hypotheses to explain the non-conformance to good governance: 
 The codes of good governance are too complex. 
 The SMEs do not possess the requisite skills necessary to 
comply. 
 The cost of compliance is too high. 
 It is not necessary to comply as is not a legal requirement to do 
so. 
 Compliance is a huge burden that can restrict the entrepreneurial 
activity. 
 
• Data collection 
In Chapter Two a literature survey was conducted with a view to 
resolving the first sub-problem and Chapter Three dealt with the 
second sub-problem. The first sub-problem was to ascertain what 
literature reveals about good governance principles and practices. 
The second sub-problem was concerned with establishing the role 
and relevance of SMEs in the South African Economy? 
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The third sub-problem is to establish the current observation with 
relation to good governance implementation by SMEs in the Port 
Elizabeth CBD. The solution to this sub-problem requires a scientific 
enquiry which will provide the empirical evidence to support or not 
support the hypothesis. This step is preceded by the collection of all 
data that seems appropriate to the resolution of the main problem. 
This data is then organised in a meaningful way so that it can be 
easily interpreted.  
 
• Data analysis and interpretation 
Once the data has been collected, it is analysed and interpreted in 
such a way that meaning can be extracted from it. The hypothesis is 
either supported or not supported. Leedy (2001: 6) argues that it is 
not the aim of the research to prove or disprove the hypothesis. If the 
data does not support the hypothesis, then it is rejected. 
 
• The research problem is resolved 
The research may or may not resolve the main problem or may 
partially resolve it. Even if it is resolved new problems that require a 
complete new research may arise (Leedy, 2001: 9). 
 
4.3 PLANNING THE EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
4.3.1 Preliminary consideration 
 
Bell (1993: 5) argues that there are various approaches or styles of 
doing research and that these styles of research use different 
methods of collecting data, although there is no research approach 
which neither prescribes nor automatically rejects any particular 
method of doing a research (Bell, 1993: 63). Any research approach 
can use a variety of methods of data collection as long as it helps to 
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produce a complete piece of research. A decision needs to be made 
to determine which methods or instruments are best suitable for a 
particular nature of information required. Bell (1993: 63) further 
contends that the first questions to be asked when planning an 
empirical study is what information is required and why. Once those 
questions have been answered, it is easy to establish the best way of 
collecting the said information. In terms of the discussions in the 
previous chapters, there is no doubt about what information is 
required.  
 
The research style suitable in obtaining the information required is 
the survey method. Bell (1993: 10) explains the primary aim of a 
survey is that of obtaining information which can be analysed and 
patterns extracted and comparisons made. This is exactly the reason 
why the survey method is considered the best method for this 
research. The method of collecting information often used in a survey 
method is to ask the same questions to all respondents, possibly 
under the same circumstances (Bell, 1993: 11). The questionnaire 
method is the best method to achieve that level of consistency and 
hence it has been chosen.  
 
4.3.2 Designing and administering the questionnaire 
 
Having decided in the previous paragraph that a questionnaire is the 
most preferred method of collecting the data, it is logical that the 
design and administration of the questionnaire is discussed. Cohen 
(1989, as quoted by Matiso, 2003: 53) states that an ideal 
questionnaire is clear, unambiguous and uniformly workable. Leedy 
(2001: 202) argues that the questionnaires are not as simple as they 
may seem, they could be tricky to construct and administer. One 
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false step can lead to poor interpretation of data or an abysmally low 
return rate (Leedy, 2001:202). 
 
Leedy (2001: 202) suggest 12 guidelines for constructing a 
questionnaire that will not only ensure a high return rate, but also 
provide quality data. In constructing the questionnaire the following 
12 point guidelines adapted from Leedy (2001: 202) were taken into 
consideration: 
 The question should be as brief as possible and solicit only 
the information relevant to the research project. 
 Use simple, clear and unambiguous language. 
 Avoid unwarranted assumptions implicit in the questions. 
 Avoid leading questions. 
 Check for consistency. 
 Determine in advance how the responses will be coded. 
 Make the respondent’s task as simple as possible. 
 Provide clear instructions. 
 Make the questionnaire attractive and professional. 
 Each question should have a purpose. 
 Conduct a pilot test. 
 Scrutinise the final product carefully to ensure that it 
adequately addresses its objective. 
 
Once the questionnaire has been constructed, the next decision to be 
made is about the distribution and return thereof. Leedy (2001: 204) 
states that the potential respondents have little or nothing to gain by 
answering and returning the questionnaire and as result many of 
them do not bother. Rogelberg and Luong (1998, as quoted by 
Leedy, 2001: 204) contend that the typical return rate for a mailed 
questionnaire is 50 per cent or less and in recent years it has steadily 
declined.  
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About 98 per cent of questionnaires will be e-mailed to the potential 
respondents and the balance will be hand-delivered with an 
accompanying letter explaining the purpose of the questionnaire. The 
period for response is deliberately made short to avoid the tendency 
of the research subjects postponing response and ultimately not 
responding. There is also a specific return date.  
 
One e-mail reminder will be sent out for the first time and thereafter a 
telephonic communication or physical visit to the subjects will be 
considered if there is still no response.   
  
4.3.3 Research constraints 
 
The following are the various constraints that can influence the data 
collection: 
 
 Time 
There is a limited time within which the research project must be 
submitted and as such the extent of collecting data could be 
influenced. 
 
 Data bases 
The unfortunate reluctance to avail the data base by those 
institutions that hold masses of data about the SME sector in the 
Port Elizabeth CBD could affect the construction of a better 
representative SME sector. Research was undertaken at the 
beginning of the survey to establish which database would best 
suit the needs of the study. Initially the Port Elizabeth Regional 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PERCCI), Eastern Cape 
Manufacturing Advisory council (ECMAC), Khula Enterprise Ltd 
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(KHULA), National Federated Chamber of Commerce (NAFCOC), 
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality (NMMM), were 
approached with regard to using their database. 
The NMMM’s database was available electronically, but 
unfortunately it was incomplete with no contact details reflected. It 
was only possible to use this database after having obtained the 
contact details from the telephone directory. NAFCOC leadership 
was kind enough to provide an unlimited access to their database. 
PERCCI, ECMAC and KHULA were unable to assist us with 
access to their database. As a result a decision to use the 
Business Link Magazine (BLM) together with PERCCI 
publications was taken.  
 Resources 
The fact that the research was conducted by one individual with 
no sponsorship, had an impact on the research in that only a 
limited number of the population were questioned. 
 
However, it should be noted that these are common constraints and 
limitations that researchers encounter all the time and they would 
have no substantial influence on the conclusion and quality of the 
research.   
 
4.3.4 Reliability and validity 
 
Leedy (2001: 31) argues that the validity and the reliability of the 
measuring instruments influence the extent to which something can 
be learned about the phenomenon of the study, the probability that 
the research would yield the statistical significance and finally the 
extent to which a meaningful conclusion can be drawn from the 
study. Whatever method for collecting data is selected, it must be 
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examined critically to assess to what extent it is both reliable and 
valid (Bell, 1993: 64). 
 
The validity of a measurement instrument is the extent to which the 
instrument measures what it is suppose to measure (Leedy, 2001: 
31). The research project was about establishing the extent to which 
SMEs implement good governance principles and practices. The only 
way to do that was to probe the leadership of these SMEs about the 
way their businesses are governed with particular emphasis on the 
way the questions are constructed as discussed in Section 4.3.3. 
More importantly, because another researcher using the 
questionnaire method would likely get the same responses, therefore, 
the questionnaire method is the best form possible to measure what 
is required. 
 
Reliability refers to the stability, dependability and predictability of the 
method used (Herbert, 1990: 51). Bell (1993: 64) states that reliability 
is the extent to which a measuring instrument produces similar 
results under constant conditions on all occasions. The questionnaire 
is standard for every respondent and well constructed to ensure its 
reliability. 
 
4.3.5 The population and the sample 
 
Wegner (2001: 4) defines the population as the collection of all the 
observations of the variable under study and about which one is 
trying to draw a conclusion in practice. This means that all the SMEs 
in the Port Elizabeth CBD form the population of this study. Although 
there are no statistics available to confirm the exact number of SMEs 
in the Port Elizabeth CBD, according to R. Verson, Manager: 
Regional Council Levy, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality 
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(personal communication, 03 November 2004), the number of the 
businesses registered for the Nelson Mandela Regional Council Levy 
is 24 000. Unfortunately the registration is not categorized in terms of 
size of the enterprise (small, medium and large) and geographical 
spread (Uitenhage, Port Elizabeth and Despatch). Using the national 
ratio of SMEs to the total number of private sector entities which is 
40,9 per cent,  it can be deduced that there are about 9 800 SMEs in 
the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Area (Ntsika Annual Review, 2002: 
38). The Port Elizabeth CBD is the busiest of the other two regions of 
the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Area and a reasonable estimate 
would be that 50 per cent of the SMEs are situated in the Port 
Elizabeth CBD. This suggest that the total population could be about 
4 900. 
 
Now that the population size has been established, it is necessary to 
determine the sample size that is representative of the population. 
There are many different approaches to sampling and each approach 
is appropriate for a specific situation (Leedy, 2001: 211). The 
sampling approach chosen for this study is what is referred to as the 
convenience sampling because of the challenges (explained in 
Section 4.3.3) in accessing a comprehensive data base, limited time 
and limited resource. This sampling approach does not attempt to 
identify a representative subset of the population, but rather those 
that are readily available (Leedy, 2001: 218). Leedy (2001: 221) 
further contends that the larger the population, the smaller the 
percentage sample would be acceptable whilst the actual number is 
high. The size of the sample also depends on how homogeneous or 
heterogeneous the population is with respect to the characteristics of 
the research interest (Leedy, 2001: 221). The SME sector in terms of 
the factors that influence compliance with good governance seems to 
have more or less the same challenges from the literature review. 
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Leedy (2001: 221) maintains that the relative size of the sample need 
not be large if the population is homogeneous. The sample size, 
therefore, would be 210 SMEs representing various sectors of the 
economy in the Port Elizabeth CBD. 
   
4.3.6 Pilot study 
 
Bell (1993: 84) contends that all data-gathering instruments should 
be piloted on a group similar to the one that will form the sample of 
the study. The questionnaire was piloted to three respondents with a 
view to establishing the following, as suggested by Bell (1993: 85): 
 How long did it take to complete?  
 Were the instructions clear?  
 Were any of the questions unclear or ambiguous?  
 Were there any objections and why?   
 Was the layout clear and attractive?  
 Any further comments? 
The feedback was received and the main thrust of the criticism was 
that: 
 Some questions were ambiguous and unclear.  
 The instructions were not clear enough.  
 Most of the open-ended questions required the 
respondents to search for information and they did not 
have time.  
 The questionnaire was long and it took a long time to 
complete (although not specified). 
The above criticism facilitated the final revision of the questionnaire 
and thereafter it was ready for the main distribution. 
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4.4 THE STATISTICAL TOOLS 
 
There are two broad categories of statistics. The first one is referred to as 
inferential statistics and it allows the researcher to make inferences about 
large populations by collecting data from relatively small samples. The 
second one which was be used in this study, is about condensing large 
volumes of data into a few summary measures (Wegner, 2001: 5). This form 
of statistics is called descriptive statistics and is concerned with organising, 
summarising and extracting the essential information contained in the raw 
data (Wegner, 2001: 5).  
 
A variety of techniques such as the graphical representation of data, 
measures of central location like the mean, mode and median and lastly, 
averages and percentages to convey the behavioural patterns of the SMEs 
in so far as good governance compliance is concerned, were used. 
 
4.5 SUMMARY 
 
The aim of Chapter 4 was to outline the planning details, describe the 
methods used and the logical explanation for the choices made. The 
planning of the empirical research encompassing the planned pilot study 
possible constraints, reliability and validity of methods used, designing and 
administering of the questionnaire, population and sampling were all defined 
and discussed. The statistical tools to be used in interpreting data were 
identified and discussed.   
 
The following chapter will focus on the presentation, analysis and 
interpretation of the data received through the questionnaire method. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF DATA 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter will resolve the fourth sub-problem namely, What is the 
situation with regard to good governance implementation by SMEs in the 
Port Elizabeth CBD? This will be done by presenting, analysing and 
interpreting the results of the empirical survey.  
 
5.2      ANALYSIS OF DATA 
 
5.2.1 BIOGRAPHICAL DATA 
 
Table 5.1 represents the number of respondents in terms of the economic 
sector they are in. The majority of respondents, about 55,9 per cent are 
business service providers followed by retail sector which is at 19,4 per cent 
and manufacturing at 13,9 per cent.  
 
Table 5.1: Respondents as per economic sector 
 Count 
Cumulative 
Count Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Retail 18 18 19.4 19.4 
Manufacturing 13 31 14.0 33.3 
Agriculture 3 34 3.2 36.6 
Business Services 52 86 55.9 92.5 
Other 4 90 4.3 96.8 
Missing 3 93 3.23 100.00 
 
Table 5.2 shows a cross tabulation of two questions about turnover and 
about the number of employees the enterprise have (see attached 
questionnaire: Addendum I-Questions A2 and A3). In keeping with the 
definition of SMEs (see Section 1.4) and using the combination of annual 
turnover and the number of employees, the medium size enterprises who 
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responded is 46 calculated as follows (26-50 employees and R10-20 million 
annual turnover, 19 respondents, 26-50 employees and R20-40 million 
annual turnover, 6 respondents, 51-200 employees and R10-20 million 
annual turnover, 4 respondents, 51-200 employees and R20-40 million 
annual turnover, 17 respondents). This means, therefore, that there are only 
39 small enterprises that responded and the remaining five respondents due 
to inadequate response to the relevant questions could not be classified 
either as small or medium size. It is important to note that quite a number of 
respondents had to be rejected as they were either micro business or large 
entities which are not the subject of this study. 
 
Table 5.2: Respondents as per size of enterprises  
Number of employees 
Annual turnover 1-5 
 
6-25 
 
26-50 51-100 
Row 
Totals 
R0.4m – R2m 0 6 6 0 12 
R2m – R10m 0 15 0 0 15 
R10m – R20m 2 10 19 4 35 
R20m – R40m 0 0 6 17 23 
All Groups 2 31 31 21 85 
  
5.2.2 SME leaders’ opinion on governance 
 
Figure 5.1 shows the opinions of the respondents about the compliance 
impediments that are inherent in the King Report on corporate governance 
from the perspective of the SMEs. The dominating view (about 46 per cent) 
is that compliance to the recommendations of the King Report on corporate 
governance distracts from core business. This dominating view that good 
governance distracts entrepreneurs from core business can only be 
addressed if there could be a demonstrable positive relationship between 
good governance and financial performance (see Section 2.6.7). As long as 
good governance is not seen as a value-adding activity, it will always come 
last in terms of business priorities.  
The second highest opinion (about 37,6 per cent) on impediments to 
conformance to the recommendation of the King Report on corporate 
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governance is that it is too complex to implement. In Section 4.2 when 
presenting the research hypothesis in explaining the possible explanations 
for non-compliance to good governance by SMEs, the complexity of the 
codes of good governance was first on the list. This could be a fact or it 
could just be a perception, since the codes of good governance were never 
written with a view to accommodate SMEs.  
 
The respondents were further asked what impedes good governance 
generally. In this regard dishonesty and lack of skilled directors seem to 
dominate with a response as high as 48,4 per cent and 44 per cent, 
respectively. Section 2.6.2 dealt with abuse, fraud and unethical conduct of 
the leadership as the critical challenge to good governance. Section 2.4.7 
went further to insist that there is no governance code that can ever hope to 
prevent those who are bent on abusing the system or breaching the 
acceptable code of good behaviour.  
 
About 17,2 per cent of the respondents do not know anything about the King 
report on corporate governance and 32,2 per cent feel that good 
governance has no strategic relevance to an organisation. On the other 
hand, about 66 per cent feel that good governance has strategic relevance 
to the organisation and also 54,8 per cent feel that the recommendations of 
the King Report on corporate governance should apply to SMEs as well.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 93 
Figure 5.1: Impediments in King Report for SMEs 
 
 
5.2.3 Ownership and control of SMEs 
 
About 89,3 per cent of the respondents are independent entities, meaning 
that they are neither part of a bigger group nor a subsidiary of a large 
company. Figure 5.2 shows the different roles the majority shareholder 
plays in the enterprise. Consistent with the strongly held view that the 
majority shareholders in the SMEs are CEOs, 36 per cent of respondents 
confirm this. Another important revelation is that a staggering 30 per cent of 
the majority shareholders are not actively involved in the business. This 
present an important dimension to the management of SMEs in that the 
agency problem as discussed in Section 2.2.1 is as important to SMEs as it 
is to large businesses. 
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Figure 5.2: The role of the majority shareholder 
 
 
Table 5.3 shows two frequencies between the role of the majority 
shareholder and the corresponding shareholding. Table 5.3 further shows 
that when the majority shareholder is the chief executive officer, the average 
(mean) shareholding of the chief executive officer is 61 per cent. This shows 
that the chief executive officer would has an outright majority, followed by a 
combination of directors at 52 per cent, passive shareholders at 48 per cent 
and lastly, the chairperson as the majority shareholder at 26 per cent. The 
average 61 per cent of the chief executive officer’s shareholding in SMEs 
could be an explanation of why many SMEs are owner-managed.    
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Table 5.3: The role of the majority shareholder and the corresponding 
shareholding. 
Majority Shareholder’s role in the business 
 
% Share of 
Majority 
Shareholder CEO Chairperson Passive 
shareholder 
Director/s 
Row 
Totals 
Count 0-5% 2 2 0 0 4 
Column Percent  6.1% 25.0% 0.0% 0.0%  
Count 6-25% 0 4 7 2 13 
Column Percent  0.0% 50.0% 27.0% 8.7%  
Count 26-75% 19 1 14 18 52 
Column Percent  57.6% 12.5% 53.9% 78.3%  
Count 76-100% 12 1 5 3 21 
Column Percent  36.4% 12.5% 19.2% 13.0%  
Count All Groups 33 8 26 23 90 
 
Table 5.4 shows two frequencies between the role of the majority 
shareholder and the protection of other stakeholders in the decision making 
process. Where the role of the majority shareholder is that of chief executive 
officer, those organisations have no code of good practice in so far as the 
protection of the interest of other stakeholders is concerned. The protection 
of other stakeholders in these organisations is through meeting the affected 
parties as confirmed by 51 per cent of the respondents. On the other hand, 
37,5 per cent of the companies whose majority shareholder is the chairman 
do have a code of good practice to ensure that the interests of stakeholders 
are protected.  Section 2.2.1 dealt with the challenge of management 
entrenchment where all that matters is profit maximisation at the expense of 
other stakeholders. 
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Table 5.4: The role of the majority shareholder and the protection of 
stakeholder interests 
Majority Shareholder’s role in the business 
 
Protection of 
other 
stakeholder 
interests 
CEO Chairperson Passive 
shareholder 
Director/s 
Row 
Totals 
Count Code of good 
practice 
0 3 2 2 7 
Column 
Percent 
 0.0% 37.5% 7.1% 8.7%  
Count Meeting 
affected parties 
17 1 8 11 37 
Column 
Percent 
 51.5
% 
12.5% 28.6% 47.8%  
Count Management 
prerogative 
8 2 14 3 27 
Column 
Percent 
 24.2
% 
25.0% 50.0% 13.0%  
Count No effort 8 2 4 7 21 
Column 
Percent 
 24.2
% 
25.0% 14.3% 30.4%  
Count All Groups 33 8 28 23 92 
 
5.2.4 Board and directors 
 
Figure 5.3 shows the percentage of most senior decision structures that is 
common amongst the respondents. The three most popular structures are 
the board, the executive committee and the shareholders or members 
committee. Contrary to popular belief, 32 per cent of the respondent’s senior 
decision making structure is the board, followed by the 
shareholders/members meetings at 23 per cent and the senior executive 
committee at 17 per cent. However, 24 per cent of the respondents confirm 
that there is no senior decision making structure whatsoever. The latter 
implies that the chief executive officer or owner-manager is the senior 
decision maker. 
 
Section 2.4.1 dealt extensively with the issue of boards and directors. 
Although it transpired from the empirical research that 32 per cent of SMEs 
have boards in place and that these boards have a predetermined term of 
office, that the board size varies from 2-10 members, and the frequency of 
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meetings average 4,8 meetings a year, these boards are nowhere near 
achieving the desire governance standards in terms of composition and 
character. 
 
Figure 5.3: The senior decision making structure 
 
 
Table 5.5 shows cross tabulations of two frequencies. On the one hand, the 
role of the majority shareholder and on the other hand the existence or non-
existence of a senior decision making structure in whatever form it may take 
is depicted. It is clear that when the majority shareholder is the chief 
executive officer only 30 per cent of the companies have the board as the 
highest decision making structure, compared to 43,3 per cent of companies 
where there is no structure at all. When the majority shareholder is not 
actively involved in the company, only seven per cent of the companies 
have no formal structure and 50 per cent would have a board as the highest 
decision making structure. In cases where the non-executive chairperson is 
the majority shareholder, 62,5 per cent of those companies have boards as 
highest decision making structure. Section 1.1 attests to the fact that SMEs 
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as the entrepreneurial organisations, are characterized by relatively weak 
stakeholders or interest groups like the unions, institutional investors and 
most importantly, with no independent boards.  Section 1.7.2 took the point 
further by saying that in an entrepreneurial organisation, power is usually 
centralized in the hands of a strong, frequently charismatic CEO who usually 
dislikes submitting to authority.  
 
Table 5.5: The role of the majority shareholder and the senior decision 
making structure.    
Majority Shareholder’s role in the business 
 
Senior decision  
making 
structure 
CEO Chairperso
n 
Passive  
shareholder 
Director
/s 
Row  
Totals 
Count Board 9 5 14 2 30 
Column 
Percent 
 30.0% 62.5% 50.0% 8.7%  
Count Senior Exec.  
Managers 
4 1 0 11 16 
Column 
Percent 
 13.3% 12.5% 0.0% 47.8%  
Count Shareholders/
members  
meeting 
4 0 12 5 21 
Column 
Percent 
 13.3% 0.0% 42.9% 21.7%  
Count None 13 2 2 5 22 
Column 
Percent 
 43.3% 25. 0% 7.1% 21.7%  
Count All Groups 30 8 28 23 89 
 
Table 5.6 below shows cross tabulation of two frequencies, on one hand the 
role of the majority shareholder and on the other hand the assessment 
process if any, for each category. When the majority shareholder is not 
active in the business, 19 per cent of the companies develop and implement 
an assessment plan for all directors. However, when the majority 
shareholder is the chief executive officer, there is no performance 
assessment whatsoever. What precipitates the development of good 
governance is the desire to control the actions of management (see Section 
2.2).   
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Table 5.6: The role of the majority shareholder and the performance    
                  assessment.     
Majority Shareholder’s role in the business 
                       
Assessment 
process for CEO Chairper
son 
Passive 
shareholder 
Director/s 
Row 
Totals 
Count Itself as a whole 0 1 0 0 1 
Column Percent  0.0% 16.7% 0. 0% 0.0%  
Count The Chairman 0 1 0 0 1 
Column Percent  0.0% 16.7% 0.0% 0.0%  
Count Each Director 0 0 3 3 6 
Column Percent  0.0% 0.0% 18.8% 16.7%  
Count Each 
Committee 
0 2 0 2 4 
Column Percent  0.0% 33.3% 0.0% 11.1%  
Count None 12 2 13 13 40 
Column Percent  100. 0% 33.3% 81.3% 72.2%  
Count All Groups 12 6 16 18 52 
 
Table 5.7 illustrates the relationship between the role of the majority 
shareholder and the attempts to comply with the recommendations of the 
King Report on corporate governance. When the majority shareholder is the 
chairperson, 75 per cent of those organisations work towards the 
implementation of the recommendations of the King Report on corporate 
governance. However, a staggering 63,6 per cent of companies whose 
majority shareholder is the chief executive officer do not work towards 
compliance with the King Report on corporate governance (See figure 5.7). 
 
Table 5.7: The role of the majority shareholder and compliance with  
                  the King Report on corporate governance.                         
 
D13 C2 
CEO 
C2 
Chairperso
n 
C2 
Passive 
shareholde
r 
C2 
Director/s 
Row  
Totals 
Count Yes 8 6 3 0 17 
Column Percent  36.4% 75.0% 11.1% 0.0%  
Count No 14 2 24 18 58 
Column Percent  63.6% 25.0% 88.9% 100.0%  
Count All Groups 22 8 27 18 75 
5.2.5 Integrated sustainable reporting 
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Figure 5.4 relates to all questions asked about the level of compliance with 
what is referred to as integrated sustainable reporting (see Addendum I- 
Question E1-10). Out of ten questions, there were only four positive 
answers. The first question with a majority of positive answers, was whether 
there is a code of good practice to manage stakeholder relations. And 55 
per cent confirmed that there is a code in place. However, a follow-up 
question to establish the impact of the existence of the code in terms of 
improving the stakeholder relations, draws a huge negative answer of 91 
per cent. This could imply that the code of good practice is just there for the 
stakeholder to see that they are taken seriously, but it is not a working 
document.  
 
The other three questions which received positive answers were on safety, 
health and environmental issues, employment equity plan and commitment 
to Black Economic Empowerment. These answers were calculated at 62 per 
cent, 66 per cent and 63 per cent, respectively. It is needless to say that 
compliance with all these three areas is a statutory requirement and, 
therefore, compliance should have been 100 per cent.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 101 
Figure 5.4: Integrated sustainable reporting 
                                                                                                           
One of the few questions which drew a majority of positive answers as 
shown in Figure 5.4, was whether the respondent’s organisation has a code 
of good practice that manages stakeholder relations. It is important to note 
that Table 5.7 below shows that 69,6 per cent of the medium sized 
enterprises have a code of good practice to manage stakeholder relations 
and only 30,4 per cent do not have. On the other hand, the majority of small 
enterprises (58,7 per cent) do not have the code of good practice in so far 
as stakeholder relations is concerned. As the organisation grows, the 
strength of its stakeholders grows as well and may happen that the medium 
size enterprises have developed the codes of good practice as a realisation 
of that fact or because of pressure from various interest groups. 
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Table 5.8: The enterprise size (small or medium) and the code of  
                  good practice for stakeholder relations.      
 
Code of good 
practice in 
place 
Size 
Small 
Size 
Medium 
Row 
Totals 
Count Yes 19 32 51 
Column Percent  41.3% 59.6%  
Count No 27 14 41 
Column Percent  58.7% 30.4%  
Count All Groups 46 46 92 
           
Table 5.8 summarises the feedback about the existence of a code of ethics 
either in the small enterprises or medium size business. The trend that was 
picked up in Table 5.7 is equally evident in Table 5.8, namely that an 
overwhelming majority of small businesses about 65,2 per cent do not have 
a code of ethics whilst the majority of medium sized businesses (52,2 per 
cent) have such a code of ethics. Code of ethics as explained in Section 
2.4.6 is about ensuring that the organisation’s employees adhere to the 
defined standards of behaviour in all business decisions and activities. The 
bigger the organisation, the higher should be the desire to set a clear ethical 
tone for the organisation. 
 
Table 5.9: The enterprise size (small or medium) and the code of   
                  ethics    
Summary Frequency Table 
Table: E3(2) x Size(2) 
 
Code of good 
ethics in place 
Size 
Small 
Size 
Medium 
Row 
Totals 
Count Yes 16 24 40 
Column Percent  34.8% 52.2%  
Count No 30 22 52 
Column Percent  65.2% 47.8%  
Count All Groups 46 46 92 
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The employment equity is government intervention to rectify the social and 
economic effects of the past discrimination. The Employment Equity Act 
(No. 55 of 1998) requires all employers who employ more than 50 
employees to develop an employment equity plan and more importantly, to 
report on the progress in the achieving of the objectives indicated in their 
plans. Although this is a good governance issue, it is equally a statutory 
requirement and hence according to Figure 5.4 about 66 per cent of SMEs 
conform.  
 
Table 5.9 takes this point further by making a comparison between small 
and medium enterprises. As would be expected, most medium size 
businesses have more than 50 employees and thus are required by law to 
have employment equity. Hence 82,6 per cent complies with this 
governance requirement. On the other hand, only half the number of small 
businesses complies.  
 
Table 5.10: The enterprise size (small or medium) and employment  
                  equity   
                        
Employment 
equity plan in 
place 
Size 
Small 
Size 
Medium 
Row 
Totals 
Count Yes 23 38 61 
Column Percent  50.0% 82.6%  
Count No 23 8 31 
Column Percent  50.0% 17.4%  
Count All Groups 46 46 92 
 
5.2.6 Accounting and auditing 
 
Figure 5.5 attempts to capture responses with a view to establishing 
whether SMEs’ accounting and auditing practices are in keeping with 
acceptable levels of good governance. The only questions with majority 
positive responses are whether the organisations have an internal audit 
function (52 per cent) and independent external auditors (60 per cent). The 
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rest responded in the negative. Internal audit serves a crucial function for 
the survival of the business since it provides for the necessary checks and 
balances and therefore is a value adding activity (See Section 1.7.6).  
   
Figure 5.5: Accounting and auditing 
                                                                                   
 
Table 5.10(a) below reflects the responses in terms of the role of the 
majority shareholder on one hand and whether those organisations have 
independent external auditors on the other. Only when the majority 
shareholder is the chief executive officer, the majority of companies (51,2 
per cent) have no independent auditors. In case of the majority shareholder 
being the chairperson, passive shareholder and just a director, about 62,5 
per cent, 75 per cent and 60,8 per cent of the companies, respectively 
confirm that they have independent external auditors. 
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Table 5.11(a): The role of the majority shareholder and external  
                      auditors   
Majority Shareholder’s role in the business 
                        
Independent 
external 
auditors in 
place 
CEO Chairperso
n 
Passive  
shareholder 
Director/s 
Row 
Totals 
Count Yes 16 5 21 14 56 
Column Percent  48.5
% 
62.5% 75.0% 60.9%  
Count No 17 3 7 9 36 
Column Percent  51.5
% 
37.5% 25.0% 39.1%  
Count All Groups 33 8 28 23 92 
 
Table 5.10(b) takes the previous discussion on independent external 
auditors to another level. This table seeks to explain under which leading 
majority shareholder amongst the four categories identified would external 
auditors be allowed to take their concerns to the non-executive director. 
Where the majority shareholder is the CEO and/or a director/s, external 
auditors would not be able to refer any dispute to the non-executive 
directors. This confirms the view that majority shareholders who have 
executive role in their businesses hardly create an opportunity for their 
decisions to be questioned. Table 5.10(b), further shows that when the 
chairperson and the passive shareholder are majority shareholders, about 
62,5 per cent and 17,8 per cent of companies, respectively would refer any 
concerns to the non-executive directors. The 62,5 per cent in respect of the 
majority shareholder being the chairperson could be attributed to the fact 
that the chairperson could be the non-executive. 
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Table 5.11(b): The role of the majority shareholder and external  
                       auditors.                           
Majority Shareholder’s role in the business 
 
Can external 
auditors refer 
to non-
executive 
directors 
CEO Chairperson Passive 
shareholder 
Director/s 
Row 
Totals 
Count Yes 0 5 5 0 10 
Column Percent  0.0% 62.5% 17.9% 0.0%  
Count No 33 3 23 23 82 
Column Percent  100.0% 37.5% 82.1% 100.0%  
Count All Groups 33 8 28 23 92 
 
Table 5.11 below indicates that small businesses and medium sized 
businesses have a different approach in relation to the appointment of 
independent external auditors. About 78,3 per cent of medium sized 
businesses do have independent external auditors, compared to only 43,5 
per cent of small business. As explained earlier, as the business grows, it is 
exposed to bigger and different kinds of risks and this requires the senior 
management to do something about it.   
 
Table 5.12: The enterprise size (small and medium) and external  
                     auditors.     
      
Independent 
external 
auditors in 
place 
Size 
Small 
Size 
Medium 
Row 
Totals 
Count Yes 20 36 56 
Column Percent  43.5% 78.3%  
Count No 26 10 36 
Column Percent  56.5% 21.7%  
Count All Grps 46 46 92 
         
5.2.7 Internal control and risk management 
Figure 5.6 shows the frequencies of responses to five statements presented 
to the respondents about internal control and risk management. Although 
the majority of responses were negative, there is quite a promising trend, for 
instance 41 per cent of respondents do have recognised internal control 
models and frameworks and also 39 per cent of respondents have an 
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ongoing process of identifying, evaluating and managing business risks. 
Section 2.4.3 explains that risk management is the processes that utilises 
internal controls to control risks that are inherent to the business activity. If 
businesses do not control or manage risks, there could be huge negative 
implications to the businesses. 
 
Figure 5.6: Internal control and risk management 
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the probability of assigning responsibility of risk management and internal 
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The probability of risk management and internal control assigned to the 
board is high when the majority shareholders are the directors and CEO. 
The reason for the high probability in the case of directors is that there is a 
good chance that some directors who form majority shareholders are not 
executive directors.  
The explanation for the high probability of having the risk management and 
internal control assigned to the board in the event of the majority 
shareholder being the CEO, is that there is a high probability that a majority 
shareholder in the SME sector is a CEO. It does not necessarily mean that 
CEOs of SMEs take risk management and internal control seriously. 
 
All SMEs whose majority shareholder is the chairperson have confirmed that 
risk management and internal control are the responsibility of the board. 
However, the probability ratio is only 0,09 for a majority shareholder who is 
the chairperson. This is so because the probability calculation has taken into 
consideration the chances that a SME would be led by a chairman.  
 
Table 5.13: The role of the majority shareholder and risk   
                    management and internal control’s responsibility.  
Majority Shareholder’s role in the business 
        
Risk 
management 
the 
responsibility 
of the board 
CEO Chairperson Passive 
shareholder 
Director/s 
Row 
Totals 
Count Yes 11 8 6 10 35 
Column Percent  33.3% 100.0% 21.4% 45.5%  
Count No 22 0 22 12 56 
Column Percent  66.7% 0.0% 78.6% 54.6%  
Count All Groups 33 8 28 22 91 
                   
Table 5.13 below makes a direct comparison between the tendencies of 
either small or medium sized businesses in assigning risk management and 
internal control responsibilities. The objective probability that the risk 
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management and internal control would be assigned to the board when the 
size of the business is: 
• Small, would be 0,11  
• Medium, would be 0,28 
The probability that a medium sized business would assign the risk 
management and internal control, the highest decision making structure, is 
higher than that of a small business. The explanation again could be the 
kind of risks that the medium sized business is exposed to compared to the 
small business.  
 
Table 5.14: The enterprise size (small and medium) and risk  
                    management and/or internal control’s responsibility 
 
Risk 
management 
the 
responsibility 
of the board 
Size 
Small 
Size 
Medium 
Row 
Totals 
Count Yes 10 25 35 
Column Percent  22.2% 54.4%  
Count No 35 21 56 
Column Percent  77.8% 45.7%  
Count All Groups 45 46 91 
 
Table 5.14 below summarises the frequencies of the responses per 
enterprise size in terms of the existence or not of recognised internal control 
models and frameworks to manage risks. About 76,1 per cent of the small 
enterprises seem to confirm that there are no internationally recognised 
internal control models to manage risks compared to 23,9 per cent which 
confirms that there are. In direct contrast, the majority of the medium size 
enterprises (58,7 per cent) confirms that there are internationally recognised 
internal control models to manage risks, with only 41,3 per cent that say that 
this is not. 
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Table 5.15: The enterprise size (small and medium) and internal  
                    control models and frameworks. 
 
Internal 
control 
models in 
place 
Size 
Small 
Size 
Medium 
Row 
Totals 
Count Yes 11 27 38 
Column Percent  23.9% 58.7%  
Count No 35 19 54 
Column Percent  76.1% 41.3%  
Count All Groups 46 46 92 
 
 
5.3   SUMMARY 
 
The aim of Chapter Five was to present, analyse, interpret and integrate the 
results of the empirical research into the literature survey. The results of the 
empirical study were then presented in the form of graphs, contingency 
tables with actual frequencies and percentages. Each graph presented was 
analysed and some form of meaning extracted with a view to integrate it 
with the literature study.  
 
Although there are isolated incidents of conformance to good governance 
principles and practices, it is quite evident that SMEs do not conform to 
good governance. The detailed presentation of the findings, conclusions and 
recommendations will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter will provide an overview of all research activities and present 
what has been achieved in each phase of the research activity. The main 
conclusions drawn from the findings of the research study presented in 
Chapter Five will be briefly summarised. The possible practical importance 
of the results will be evaluated with a view to developing feasible 
recommendations. Finally, a brief recommendation will be made for 
additional study on areas related to the research problem that have been 
recognised as worthy of further investigation. 
   
6.2 SUMMARY 
 
The research problem as stated in Chapter 1, Section 1.1 was to ascertain 
to what extent SMEs in the Port Elizabeth CBD have implemented good 
governance principles and practices in the formulation of organisational 
structures, everyday decision making processes and more importantly, in 
the organisational operations. For this main problem to be resolved it was 
prudent to sub-divide it into four sub-problems as follows: 
 
• What does the literature reveal about ethical and good governance 
principles and practises? 
 
Chapter Two was dedicated to resolve this sub-problem by looking 
into good governance practices both locally and internationally. In 
terms of the historical evolution of good governance, it was found that 
there are three key theoretical frameworks that drive the development 
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of all governance codes. These are the agency theory, transactional 
theory and the stakeholder theory (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2) .  The 
relevance of good governance and its benefits to today's business 
was discussed. It was concluded that SMEs that conform to good 
governance will achieve long-term sustainability and growth. These 
SMEs will be able to attract and maintain good relationships with 
business financiers and investors alike. The confidence of other 
stakeholders will be greatly improved and that will help SMEs to 
achieve the required levels of loyalty from its stakeholders. More 
importantly, it was discovered that the implementation of good 
governance indirectly creates leaders of good quality. 
 
All the elements that are required to fully implement good governance 
were discussed with a view to establishing their practicality at the 
level of SMEs (Chapter 2, section 2.4). It transpired that good 
governance requires good leadership. Good governance is an 
organisation-wide intervention that encompasses all aspects of 
organisational activity, and that good governance should be driven by 
properly constituted boards that can provide independent judgement 
from the SME’s owner-manager. The challenge of having 
independent and active boards at an SME level was explored. It was 
concluded that it may be impossible sometimes to expect to have 
independent boards. 
 
The character of organisations that practice good governance was 
explored highlighting discipline, transparency, accountability, 
responsibility, independency, fairness and social responsibility.  This 
discussion was followed by an in-depth discussion on the challenges 
that continue to plague conformance to good governance as they 
apply to SMEs. The challenge of setting an appropriate remuneration 
level for top management, the greed and self-serving individuals who 
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are bent on abusing public trust, the unfettered powers of owner 
managers and CEOs, the lack of shareholder activism, the 
misrepresentation of business financial performance, global 
convergence to various pieces of code of good governance and 
finally, the inability to demonstrate a positive relationship between 
good governance and financial performance was discussed in detail. 
  
• What is the role and relevance of SMEs in the South African 
economy? 
 
It was critical to resolve this sub-problem because it is the SMEs that 
are the subject of the research and therefore their relevance to the 
South African economy becomes important. Chapter Three looked at 
this sub-problem, the South African economy was reviewed using the 
five key macro economic objectives and found that it is rather 
performing rather well.  
 
The SME sector was profiled looking at its contribution to economic 
growth, contribution to employment, contributions to provincial 
economies, new entrants and liquidations. The SME contribution to 
GDP and employment was found to be 30,2 per cent and 36,5 per 
cent respectively (See Table 3.2 and 3.3). It was further concluded 
that the number of liquidations, about 4300 in 2003, was fairly high 
considering that there are only just more that one million active 
businesses in South Africa.  
 
The role and the economic relevance of SMEs were discussed in 
detail. It was found that SMEs contribute to employment creation, 
poverty alleviation, income redistribution, investment contribution, 
democratisation of economic participation, promotion of competition 
and finally to economic growth and development.    
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The case for the development of the SME sector was discussed and 
the following were the compelling reasons for placing SME 
development high on the agenda: 
1. Labour absorption capacity of SMEs. 
2. Average capital cost per job created compared with 
large organisation. 
3. The flexibility of SMEs in view of varying demands of 
globalisation. 
4. SMEs create opportunities for the unemployed. 
5. Contribution to skills development. 
6. SMEs as aids to large businesses. 
7. SME role in innovation. 
 
The challenges and constraints of the SMEs were discussed together 
with their corresponding opportunities. The main points discussed 
were the access to finance, management capacity, taxation, labour 
legislation, public procurement and globalisation. 
  
• What is the situation with relation to good governance implementation 
by SMEs in the Port Elizabeth CBD? 
 
Chapter Four attempted to resolve this sub-problem which is the core 
of the research problem. The results of the empirical study were 
presented mainly in the form of tables and graphs in the previous 
chapter. The empirical study revealed relevant information to the 
research study and some of that information will be discussed under 
Section 6.3. 
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• What recommendations can be made to improve the ability of SMEs 
to overcome the barriers (if any) to the implementation of good 
governance? 
 
The discussion of the recommendation will be done in Section 6.4 of 
this chapter. 
 
6.3 CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this section the conclusions of all the findings both in the literature review 
and the empirical study will be discussed. 
 
6.3.1 Literature review on good governance  
 Good governance is imperative for long-term growth of 
businesses and especially SMEs (see Chapter Two, Section 2.3). 
 That good governance is driven by a desire to control the 
activities of management (see Chapter Two, Section 2.2). 
 Boards or some form of senior executive structure must be in 
place in all organisations to maintain the balance in decision 
making (see Chapter Two, Section 2.4.1). 
 Even large businesses are still grappling with the governance 
codes and it is particularly going to be difficult for SMEs (see 
Chapter 2, Section 2.6).  
 That the recommendations of the King Report on corporate 
governance taken in its entity may not be applicable to the SMEs 
due to their nature (see Chapter Two, Section 2.4).  
 
6.3.2 Literature review on the SME sector 
 
 SMEs are a critical element of future economic growth is South 
Africa (see Chapter Three3, Section 3.4). 
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 Management capacity at SME sector level remains a big 
challenge (see Chapter Three, Section 3.6.2). 
 That there is an acknowledgement by government that the SMEs 
have an important role to play in its fight against poverty, 
unemployment and so on (see Chapter Three, Section 3.7). 
 
6.3.3 Empirical study results 
 
a) Acceptance or rejection of the hypothesis 
Prior to discussing the results of the empirical study, it is important to 
revisit the hypothesis. It was stated (See Section 4.2) earlier that 
SMEs do not comply with good governance because:  
 The codes of good governance are too complex. 
 The SMEs do not possess the requisite skills necessary to 
comply. 
 The cost of compliance is too high. 
 It is not necessary to comply as is not a legal requirement to do 
so. 
 Compliance is a huge burden that can restrict the entrepreneurial 
activity. 
 
The results of the survey (see Figure 5.1) show that the cost of 
compliance, complexity of the codes and the view that good 
governance detracts from core business are the dominating reasons 
for non compliance. The latter reason means the same as the 
suggestion that compliance is a huge burden that can restrict 
entrepreneurial activity. In areas where compliance to an element of 
a governance code is also a statutory requirement, there seems to be 
a high level of compliance (see Table 5.9 and Figure 5.4). This 
confirms the suggested hypothesis that it is not necessary to comply 
with good governance as it is not a legal requirement.  
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About 44 per cent of the respondents again felt that the lack of skilled 
directors greatly impedes compliance with good governance (see 
Section 5.2.2). This confirms the hypothesis that SMEs lack the 
requisite skills necessary to comply with good governance.  
 
Overall the hypothesis is accepted. 
 
b) Other findings: 
 Figure 5.2 reveals that 30 per cent of majority shareholders 
are not active participants in their business. This is a startling 
revelation considering that SMEs have always been owner-
managed. The most important deduction to be made from this 
is that there will be a principal and agent relationship in SMEs 
as well (see Section 2.2.1). This agency problem would 
expedite the implementation of good governance at an SME 
sector level.  
 The majority of SMEs, about 36 per cent are still managed by 
the majority shareholder. Table 5.3 indicates that the average 
shareholding in that case would be 61 per cent. This could 
imply that the balance of shareholders are either working for 
the organisation or are just passive shareholders. Whatever 
role the minority shareholders would play in the organisation, 
what is important is that the CEO should not have completely 
unfettered powers.    
 There are isolated instances of compliance with governance. 
However, this compliance is not an organisation-wide 
intervention that is co-ordinated from the top. 
 About 72 per cent of the respondents (see Figure 5.3) confirm 
that there are senior decision making structures in their 
organisations. This senior decision making structure in the 
SMEs is either the board (32 per cent), shareholder/members 
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meeting (23 per cent) or senior executive committee (17 per 
cent). Even though these structures are not constituted in 
terms of the codes of good governance, it shows that the 
CEOs or owner-managers do account somewhere.  
 The level of compliance differs according to the size of the 
enterprise. The medium sized businesses perform better in 
terms of good governance compared to the small enterprises 
(see Table 5.7, 5.8, 5.9 and 5.11 and Figure 5.8). This could 
imply that organisations as they grow, react to good 
governance needs on ad hoc basis.  The example of a code of 
good practice to manage stakeholder relations in Table 5.7 
could be as a result of the experience of not having the code 
or as a result of the pressure applied by various interest 
groups in the organisation such as unions, creditors and other 
stakeholders.  
 
6.4 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.4.1 It is a legal requirement that organisations incorporated as 
close corporations and companies must appoint a qualified 
accountant. Failing this, these organisations will not be 
registered (Companies Act and Close Corporations act). It is 
recommended that these accountants should not confine 
themselves to the financial aspects of the business only, but 
also look at governance of these small businesses. 
 
6.4.2 When the King Report on corporate governance confines itself 
to large businesses it indirectly discourages compliance by 
small businesses. At the same time, if SMEs are encouraged 
to comply with the recommendations of the King Report on 
corporate governance, they would find it difficult if not 
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impossible to comply and that would lead to further 
disillusionment about good governance. At the risk of having a 
proliferation of codes of good governance for all different kinds 
of economic sectors and sub-sectors, it is recommended that a 
sub-code for SMEs be developed. 
 
6.4.3 There is a strong view that good governance should not be 
made a legal requirement as this would lead to a “tick box” 
reaction and that would render the intent of good governance 
irrelevant. It is recommended, therefore, that there should be 
incentives for SMEs to comply with good governance. This 
could be achieved by making an additional recommendation to 
the existing code of governance recommendations. This 
recommendation should require large and establish 
businesses to insist on good governance in the SMEs they 
deal with at any level.  
 
6.4.4 Section 2.3 dealt in detail with the relevance and benefits of 
good governance and it can be concluded from that section 
that good governance is a critical element of business 
management. This implies that good governance knowledge 
becomes a key competence for every manager, especially 
senior management. It is recommended that institutions of 
higher learning should have good governance in their 
curriculum.  
 
6.4.5 The South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) should 
develop a qualification or unit standard on good governance.  
This will facilitate uniformity in the training of small business 
owners on good governance and ensure a fast roll-out of the 
training. More importantly, SMEs would be able to claim 
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training funds from their respective Sectoral Education and 
Training Authority (SETAs) as they would be training towards 
a recognized qualification.  
 
6.5 RECOMMENDEND FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
One of the major challenges to good governance is that there is no 
conclusive empirical evidence that it leads to improved financial results. 
There are elements of good governance such as internal control and risk 
management which on their own can be considered to be value-adding. 
However, a study conducted in America (see Chapter Two, Section 2.6.7) 
concludes that board independence, separation of roles of the CEO and the 
chairman do not necessarily lead to improved financial performance. 
Conclusive research needs to be done to establish the link between good 
governance and financial performance, especially in the SME sector.  
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Post Box 1265 
Port Elizabeth 
6000  
07 October 2004 
 
For the Attention: The Owner/CEO/Manager/Director/Member/Partner 
Nelson Mandela Metro 
 
Dear Sir/Madam 
A QUESTIONAIRE TO ESTABLISH TO WHAT EXTENT BUSINESSES 
COMPLY WITH GOOD GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 
 
Kindly find attached a questionnaire in relation to the above. 
My name is Dumisani Mpafa, Student no. 20232354, studying MBA with PE Technikon. 
In accordance with the requirements of the MBA I am expected to complete a research. 
The purpose of this research is to establish whether businesses and in particular SMEs do 
comply with the good governance practices. The interested parties in this research are the 
government, the business community and the research fraternity. 
Kindly assist and complete this questionnaire which should not take more than 10 
minutes of your time. When completed please fax back to 041-4841824 or call 082 497 
4152 to arrange for collection at your premises. You could e-mail it to 
mwsfsec@mweb.co.za as well. The due date for the completion is Wednesday 13, October 
2004. 
I wish to thank you in advance for taking time out of your busy schedule to complete this 
questionnaire. 
 
Yours faithfully, 
Dumisani Mpafa 
MBA Student, Port Elizabeth Technikon 
082 497 4152 
 
 
NB: Should you wish to receive a copy of the summary of the findings, 
please indicate as such and it will be forwarded to you in due course. 
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A. Company information 
Instruction: Please tick the empty box next to the correct answer. If it is possible please 
tick one box per question.  
EXAMPLE 
Who are the majority members of the remuneration committee? 
Experts on pay systems  1 Executive Directors  3 
Independent directors  2 Non-executive directors  4 
Other (please specify)  5 
There are 3 possible answers: 
1. That there is no remuneration committee in place, in which case your answer 
would be ‘N/A’ placed adjacent to the question. 
2. Executive directors and non-executive directors (or any other combination) are 
equally represented and are in majority. You have to tick both box 3 & 4 as.  
3. One category is in majority. You tick in the box next to it. 
 
1.  Which business sector does your company operate in? 
Retail  1 Agriculture  3 
Manufacturing  2 Business Services  4 
Other (please specify)  5 
2.  What is your current annual turnover? 
R0 – R0.4 million  1 R10 Mil –R20 mil  4 
R0,4 mil – 2 Million  2 R20 mil – R40 million  5 
R2 Mil –R10 million  3 R40 Million and above  6 
3. What is your current number of employees 
1 - 5  1 26- 50  3 
6 - 25  2 51-200  4 
200 and above  5 
4. What is your current gross asset value(in Rands) 
0 – 2 million  1 4,1 – 15 million  3 
2,1 -  4 million  2 15,1 million and above  4 
5.  When was your company Founded? 
Before 1994  1 1999 - 2002  3 
1994-1998  2 2003 - 2004  4 
6. The details of the respondent? 
Passive Shareholder  1 Company Secretary  4 
CEO/managing director  2 Executive manager  5 
Executive Chairman  3 Junior manager  6 
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B. GENERAL OPINION ON GOVERNANCE 
Instruction: Please tick the correct answer. 
 
1. What impediments do you recognise in King II Report for SMEs 
Costly to implement  1 Distracts from core business  3 
Complex to implement  2 Disclosures are exposing  4 
2. What in your opinion greatly impedes Good Corporate Governance? 
Lack of leadership  1 Dishonesty  3 
Lack of skilled directors  2 Lack of professionalism  4 
3. Do you know anything about King II report on   
    Corporate governance? 
Yes No 
4.  Do you think good governance has any strategic  
     relevance to an organisation? 
Yes No 
5. Do you think the King II Code should apply to SMEs as 
well? 
Yes No 
6. Have your efforts to comply to King II have any   
    positive impact on our company performance? 
Yes No 
 
C. OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 
Instruction: Please tick the empty box next to the correct answer. If it is possible please 
tick one box per question.  
 
1. What is the ownership structure of your business? 
Part of a group   1 Independent entity  3 
Have a holding company  2 Consortium/joint venture  4 
2.  What role does the majority owner (if an individual) play in the              
     business? 
CEO  1 Passive shareholder  3 
Chairperson  2 Director/s  4 
Other (please specify)   
3. What is the percentage share of the majority shareholder? 
0-5%  1 26-75%  3 
6-25%  2 76-100%  4 
4. What is the percentage share of the executive management ownership? 
0-5%  1 26-75%  3 
6-25%  2 76-100%  4 
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5. How are the interest of other stakeholders protected in decision       
    making? 
There is a code of good 
practice 
 1 Management prerogative  3 
Through meeting 
affected parties 
 2 No effort  4 
D. BOARD AND DIRECTORS 
Instruction: Please tick the empty box next to the correct answer. If it is possible please 
tick one box per question.  
 
1. What is the most senior decision making structure of your company? 
Board  1 Shareholders/members 
meeting 
 3 
Senior Executive 
managers 
 2 None   4 
Other (specify)  5 
2.  What committees does your board/or senior decision making structure 
have? 
Remuneration  1 Nomination   4 
Audit  2 Risk  5 
Finance committee  3 Executive committee  6 
None  7 
3. What is the term of your board members? 
1 year  1 4-6 years  3 
2- 3 years  2 More than 6 years  4 
4. Who are the majority members of the audit committee? 
  1 Executive Directors  3 
Independent directors  2 Non-executive directors  4 
Other (please specify)  5 
5. Who Chairs the Audit Committee? 
Chairman  1 Financial Director  3 
CEO  2 Non-executive director  4 
Other (please specify)  5 
6. Who are the majority members of the remuneration committee? 
Experts on pay systems  1 Executive Directors  3 
Independent directors  2 Non-executive directors  4 
Other (please specify)  5 
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7. Who Chairs the remuneration committee? 
Chairman  1 Financial Director  3 
CEO  2 Non-executive director  4 
Other (please specify)  5 
8.  How often does the board meet? 
1 time a year  1 3 – 6 times a year  3 
2 times a year  2 6 and more times a year  4 
9. Has the board developed and implemented an assessment process for? 
Itself as a whole  1 Each Committee  4 
The Chairman  2 All the above  5 
Each Director   3 None  6 
 
Instruction: Please write the correct number. 
 
10.  What is the size of your board or this decision-making 
structure (Number of participants) 
  
11. Out of the total (given in question 10), how many are non-
executive members/directors? (Directors who are not 
members of management)? 
  
12.  What is the number of independent directors (Directors   
     who are not associated with the company)? 
  
Instruction: Please tick the correct answer. 
 
13. Does the board work towards compliance with King II? Yes No 
14. Are there concrete succession plans and nomination 
procedures for your board members 
Yes No 
15. Do you have a competent and capable company 
secretary? 
Yes No 
16. Do you have a committee selection procedure in place? Yes No 
17. Do committee memberships alternate annually? Yes No 
18. Do committees have access to external advice Yes No 
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E. INTEGRATED SUSTAINABLE REPORTING 
Instruction: Please tick the correct answer. 
 
 
1. Does your organisation have a code of good practice   
    that manages stakeholder relations? 
Yes No 
2. Does your organisation report about stakeholder   
    relation on its annual reports? 
Yes No 
3. Does your organisation have a code of good ethics that     
    determines the standard of ethical behaviour? 
Yes No 
4. Does your organisation disclose in its annual report the   
    extent to which it is satisfied that the set ethical        
    standards are met and plans for corrective action if not    
    met? 
Yes No 
5. Does your organisation have a comprehensive plan on   
    Safety, Health and Environmental issues? 
Yes No 
6. Does your organisation reports on achievement of its   
    plan in relation to Safety, Health and Environment? 
Yes No 
7. Does your organisation have an employment equity   
    (EE) plan in place? 
Yes No 
8. Does your company have a commitment towards  
    redressing the continued unequal distribution of     
    ownership, management and control of economic  
    resources through Black Economic Empowerment? 
Yes No 
9. Does your organisation have a developmental and  
    succession plan for its human capital? 
Yes No 
10.Does your organisation reports on human capital and  
     transformational policies and practices on its annual   
     report? 
Yes No 
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F. ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING 
 
Instruction: Please tick the correct answer. 
 
1. Does your organisation have an internal auditing  
    function? If NO why? 
…………………………………………………
…………………………………………………
…………………………………………………
………………………………………………… 
Yes No 
2. Does your organisation have independent external   
    auditors? If NO why? 
…………………………………………………
…………………………………………………
…………………………………………………
………………………………………………… 
Yes No 
3. Will the external auditors be able to turn to the non-  
    executive directors to raise any concerns? If NO, why? 
…………………………………………………
…………………………………………………
…………………………………………………
………………………………………………… 
Yes No 
4. Are your external auditors involved in your business at   
    any other level other than auditing like consulting? 
Yes No 
5. Does your organisation have an audit committee? If  
    NO, why? 
…………………………………………………
…………………………………………………
…………………………………………………
………………………………………………… 
Yes No 
6. Are the members of the audit committee financially  
   literate? 
Yes No 
7. Is the audit committee comprised of majority  
    independent and non-executive directors? If NO, why? 
…………………………………………………
…………………………………………………
…………………………………………………
………………………………………………… 
Yes No 
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8. Does your organisation approve the internal audit  
    function charter and the internal audit plan? 
Yes No 
9. Does the audit committee have discussions with  
    external auditors in the absence of executive   
    management? 
Yes No 
10. Does the audit committee recommend the appointment  
      and removal of external auditors 
Yes No 
 
 
G. INTERNAL CONTROL AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
Instruction: Please tick the correct answer. 
 
1. Is risk management and internal control the   
    responsibility of the board? If NO, who? 
…………………………………………………
…………………………………………………
…………………………………………………
………………………………………………… 
Yes No 
2. Is there a risk management committee in place? Yes No 
3. Are there any recognized and internal control models   
    and frameworks in place to manage risks? 
Yes No 
4. Is there an ongoing process of identifying, evaluating  
    and managing the significant business risks faced by the  
    company? 
Yes No 
5. Does the board properly monitor the control systems of   
    the company and ensure that assets are properly  
    protected? 
Yes No 
 
